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Reflective Essay 
 
As a History major, I am a lover of libraries and research; of long, grueling nights spent 
examining endless pages of sources. The life of an historian is inextricably tied to research: we 
must investigate the remnants of history in order to retell its story, but the discipline is also 
centrally devoted to reflecting upon the meaning and consequences of the processes through 
which we conduct these investigations. There is no History without Historiography, for only in 
contemplating how and why we approach the past can we derive a deeper and more 
comprehensive meaning from it.   
 My senior history thesis, then, has been a process of research and reflection. I began my 
research after my thesis seminar met with librarian Adam Rosenkranz for suggestions of 
resources through the Claremont College Library. Mr. Rosenkranz helped me identify specific 
databases through which I might locate news articles from the 1960s—such as Periodicals Index 
Online or the New York Times Online Archive—but he also approached me to say how excited 
he was about my project, for he, too, was a lover of Arendt’s ideas. After exchanging our views 
on Arendt, I felt not only more equipped to begin my research, but also more excited. My 
conversation with Mr. Rosenkranz helped remind me, at the beginning of this process, that 
research is personal, driven by our passions and sustained by our endless curiosity.  
 The first problem I encountered over the course of this journey was not a lacuna of 
primary and secondary sources, but an overabundance of scholarship. My topic directly engages 
scholarship about both Holocaust history and Arendt’s political theory, two bodies of thought 
that are saturated with previous research. My central challenge was not necessarily to find new 
primary or even secondary sources, but to examine how these sources have hitherto been used, 
finding possibility not in the existence of a source but in the manner we approach it. There is, to 
be sure, an overwhelming amount of scholarship on the Holocaust, and yet, I still feel there is 
room for conversation; indeed, in history there is always the possibility for deepening or even 
changing the story we tell. There is a paradoxical way in which newness can always be found in 
the past, for though we enrich our understanding of history as time goes by, we can also always 
find points through which to unravel the historical status quo, revisiting our sources in order to 
find new meanings, interpretations and possibilities in our understanding of the past.  
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 I have continued to write my thesis with the help of two readers, Professor Chu of the 
History Department, with whom I meet weekly, and Professor Seery of the Politics Department, 
with whom I meet almost biweekly. My professors have been indispensible in helping to identify 
preexisting conversations, most notably in suggesting secondary sources as points of departure—
with my Professor’s suggestions, I can identify what/who the author cites and who in turn is 
citing them, finding the waves a work of scholarship makes within the academic conversations to 
which it speaks. Beyond providing hints for entering a scholarly conversation, together my 
readers have provided perspectives from the two very different disciplines my topic involves. I 
have been struck most by the disparity in their approach: each Professor has given me distinct 
advice and glances into their discipline’s preexisting scholarship on the matter. I have learned 
through my readers not only how different disciplines can approach the same problem, but also 
how fruitful research can be when engaging a multiplicity of approaches in the same 
conversation. It is, then, my task to unite these disparate methods, but also to renegotiate my 
relationship to them.  
 After conducting my initial primary and secondary research through the library databases, 
I discovered several sources cited in the preexisting scholarship I wanted to examine but could 
not find. Though an enormous amount of my primary source research is available online—
whether it be through Arendt’s published correspondence, taped interviews, or digitized 
periodical archives—, there is also a sizable collection of unpublished sources in The Hannah 
Arendt Papers of the Library of Congress, most of them letters, lecture notes and newspaper 
clippings. One can only consult these sources in person, not to mention the fact that 
undergraduate access to the manuscript division of the library is restricted unless sponsored by 
faculty advisors. Over winter break, I visited the library and was successful in gaining access to 
the Hannah Arendt Papers, a thrilling experience for an aspiring historian. This chapter of my 
journey proved to me how challenging simply accessing a source can be, reaffirming my gratitude 
for the largely digitized and democratic access my college library has afforded me.  
 Yet, the most important experience from my research at the Library of Congress was 
finding primary sources that surprised and deeply excited me. If earlier in my project I had 
learned how to engage a multiplicity of lenses through which to analyze a source, I learned here 
of the importance of allowing these sources to themselves inform the analytical lens you employ. 
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In other words, revisiting primary sources can be energizing in the extent to which they inspire 
new possibilities for interpretation, beyond simply engaging the preexisting approaches to the 
text. In fact, after reading Hannah Arendt’s personal remarks on the controversy surrounding her 
book, I was inspired to use my thesis as an opportunity to revisit the controversy through Arendt’s 
own eyes, an approach not yet conducted in the preexisting scholarship.  
Most centrally, my extensive primary source research provided me with a dynamic, rather 
than static, understanding of the perspectives of those engaged in the Eichmann controversy. In 
other words, the historian can cull new meaning from the past not simply by reexamining its 
remnants, but also by dynamically reconstructing its meaning and ability to affect the present, 
allowing the past to find new life through the pen of the historian. In fact, my experience with 
the research process has become integral in forming my arguments about the controversy itself: a 
central crux of my argument stems from intervening in the prevailing historiography, arguing for 
a more dynamic reading of Arendt and her controversy—seeing it not as a largely unproductive 
conversation about the Holocaust, as many historians have, but revisiting the perspectives of the 
historical actors involved in the story in order to revive new meanings for the present. It is up to 
the historian to give new life to the past, challenging static interpretations and rewriting the 
stories that form our understanding of the world. 
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Introduction 
 
The controversy touched off by Hannah Arendt’s Eichmann In Jerusalem: A Report on 
the Banality of Evil did not take long to become vicious. Published initially as a five-part series1 
in The New Yorker and subsequently as a book in 1963, Eichmann in Jerusalem almost 
immediately provoked outrage amongst American Jews. By the end of March 1963 the uproar 
was palpable, and many of Arendt’s friends wrote to her while she was vacationing in Europe to 
warn her of the storm brewing in America. As human rights activist Henry Schwarzschild put it 
in a March 29 letter to Arendt, “the entire Jewish community is up in arms.”2 The controversy, 
however, was both acrimonious and long-lasting. Even in 1966, the debate was far from over. In 
fact, the debate seemed only to have escalated over the course of three years. A man from 
Oregon named S. N. Karchmer, for example, wrote to Arendt in January 1966 to plead with her 
“to cease these frightening polemics.”3 Dismayed by the vicious tone of the debate, Karchmer 
begged Arendt “to stop this public controversy…out of respect for the memory of the millions of 
innocent Jewish dead, victims of the horrible purge years.”4 Unfortunately for Karchmer the 
debate did not end there, and, in any case, Arendt did not have the power to stop it. The 
controversy had a life of its own, outside of the terms established by Arendt in Eichmann in 
Jerusalem.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The five-part series began on February 16, 1963, and ended on March 16, 1963.  
2 Henry Schwarzchild to Hannah Arendt, 19 March 1963. The Hannah Arendt Papers, Library of 
Congress.  
3 S. N. Karchmer to Hannah Arendt, 28 January 1963. The Hannah Arendt Papers, Library of 
Congress.  
4 Ibid.  
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Arendt’s report covered the 1961 trial of the infamous Nazi, Adolf Eichmann, for his role 
in the “Final Solution.” The topic was emotional in itself, but Hannah Arendt’s coverage not 
only opened up raw wounds, but also probed these wounds with hard questions. Arendt forced 
her readers to confront the possibility that Eichmann, the murderer of the Jews, was not a sadistic 
monster but rather a banal, “terrifyingly normal” 5 man. Moreover, in reporting on a trial about 
Nazi deeds, Arendt ventured to examine the behavior of the Jews during the Holocaust as well. 
Arendt was most controversial when she discussed the behavior of Jewish council leaders during 
the Nazi war on the Jews. As she put it in Eichmann in Jerusalem, “wherever Jews lived [during 
the Holocaust], there were recognized Jewish leaders, and this leadership, almost without 
exception, cooperated in one way or another, for one reason or another, with the Nazis.”6  
Although the report covered a landmark trial of international importance, the public 
reacted more strongly to the report than to the trial itself. The report helped provoke questions 
that went beyond merely Eichmann’s role in the catastrophe, although Arendt was adamant that 
the scope of her report was limited to topics mentioned during the trial. To be sure, questions and 
topics abounded, and the controversy grew into a conversation more important and bigger than 
Adolf Eichmann. The National Jewish Post & Opinion, for example, noted in March 1963 that 
“there will be a furor raised by the series of five extensive articles by Hannah Arendt on the 
Eichmann trial,” but the Post also remarked that the “consternation” about her report “could 
leave a more lasting impression on the Jews of the United States and the world than either his 
apprehension or the testimony in the Israeli court.”7 It was not simply the trial of Adolf 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (New York: Penguin 
Books, 2006), 76.  
6 Ibid., 125.  
7 “Who Sent the Jews to the Camps?” The National Jewish Post & Opinion, March 8, 1963. The 
Hannah Arendt Papers, Library of Congress.  
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Eichmann that mattered, for it was Arendt’s retelling of it that was the crucial concern. Even in 
the spring of 1964, people recognized the controversy’s, as opposed to the trial’s, importance. 
Writer Harris Dienstfrey, for example, wrote to Arendt telling her about his idea for “a book that 
would examine the response to Eichmann in Jerusalem.”8 Although this book in particular never 
came to fruition, the conversation, distinct from the coverage about Adolf Eichmann, swirled 
into the center of attention.  
 And yet, roughly fifty years later after the publication of Eichmann in Jerusalem, a book9 
entirely devoted to understanding the American Jewish reactions to Arendt’s work has not been 
written. This is not to deny the fact that there is an enormous amount of scholarship that 
addresses and analyzes the controversy for its bearing on Arendt’s legacy and on Jewish history. 
Those scholars who do address the controversy most often embed their understanding of the 
debate within larger arguments about Arendt’s work or the history of the Holocaust. There is 
much less scholarship—with a few notable exception—that focuses primarily on the response to 
the event as a subject of inquiry in and of itself. This study thus hopes to explore Eichmann in 
Jerusalem and its response in America, extracting the controversy as a subject deserving 
attention in its own right. This is not to ignore the relevance of previous scholarship on Arendt’s 
theories or the Holocaust to a story of the controversy. On the contrary, this study hopes to 
engage those larger studies as context in order to shed light on the meaning of the controversy.  
Scholarship on Arendt is, unsurprisingly, quite vast, but its history has been colored and 
informed by a few crucial events. The first critiques of Eichmann in Jerusalem were primarily 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Harris Dienstfrey to Hannah Arendt, 14 April 1964. The Hannah Arendt Papers, Library of 
Congress.  
9 This is not to ignore the fact that there are some articles and chapters of books entirely devoted 
to the controversy. See Anson Rabinbach, “Eichmann in New York: The New York Intellectuals 
and the Hannah Arendt Controversy,” October 108 (April 1, 2004): 97–111. 
 8 
those embroiled in the controversy it provoked. This first stage of scholarly reaction will be a 
significant bulk of the primary source material for this project. As the distance grew from the 
event itself, scholarship moved the conversation away from the original debates of the 1960s. A 
year before Arendt’s death in 1975, Margaret Canovan wrote Hannah Arendt: A Reinterpretation 
of Her Political Thought (1974),10 the first “book-length introduction to Arendt’s political 
thought.”11 In her book, Canovan argued “responses to the most dramatic events of her time lie at 
the very centre of Arendt’s thought,”12 insisting that Arendt’s thought must be centrally 
understood as “reflections on the political catastrophes of the mid-century.”13 Later, in 1982, 
Elisabeth Young-Bruehl’s acclaimed biography of Arendt, Hannah Arendt: For Love of the 
World,14 helped place her political thought within a historical and biographical context, not to 
mention the fact that her revelation of Arendt’s affair with Martin Heidegger restarted 
controversy. Young-Bruehl’s portrait of Arendt’s private life and personal involvement in the 
affairs of the Jewish people deepened an understanding of Arendt’s motivations and perspective. 
Arendt’s personal history cast Arendt’s political legacy in a different light: as a German-Jew, 
former-Zionist, and female political theorist, Arendt seemed to be altogether an ambiguous 
person, someone who could not easily fit into one category. Yet, as Young-Bruehl shows, 
Arendt’s life had been deeply dictated by her own Jewishness. After getting arrested by the 
Gestapo in 1933 for her involvement with a Zionist organization that helped Jewish children 
leave Germany, Arendt fled to France. Although she was later imprisoned in a concentration 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Margaret Canovan, Hannah Arendt: A Reinterpretation of Her Political Thought (Cambridge 
University Press, 1994).  
11 Richard J. Bernstein, Hannah Arendt And The Jewish Question, Lst MIT Press ed. 
(Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 1996), 7.  
12 Canovan, Hannah Arendt, 7.  
13 Ibid.   
14 Elisabeth Young-Bruehl, Hannah Arendt: For Love of the World, 2nd ed. (New Haven, Conn.; 
London: Yale University Press, 2004). 
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camp under the Vichy regime,15 Arendt was able to escape to New York in 1941.  
In 1978, however, Ron Feldman edited and helped release Arendt’s so called “Jewish 
writings,”16 a collection of essays Arendt wrote on the “Jewish question” between the 1930s and 
her death in 1975. Before Feldman’s collection, Arendt’s work on Jewish history “were for the 
most part neglected and forgotten.”17 As Feldman explains, Arendt “was subjected to a modern 
form of excommunication from the Jewish community”18 partly as a consequence of Eichmann 
in Jerusalem and the anger it provoked. Feldman’s collection sparked great interest in a 
reinterpretation of Arendt’s political thought as “essentially linked”19 with her conception of 
Jewish history.  Given the release of Arendt’s Jewish writings in 1978, it is no surprise that 
scholars almost immediately began to contextualize Eichmann in Jerusalem within Arendt’s 
larger theories on Jewish history. In a 1981 article entitled “The Origins of Eichmann in 
Jerusalem: Hannah Arendt's Interpretation of Jewish History,”20 for example, Sharon Muller 
argued that Arendt expresses her preconceived theories of Jewish history in Eichmann, for “the 
author's judgments on this issue were part and parcel of a larger theory of the Jewish experience 
in modern times, on which she had been working since the early 1930s.”21  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Young-Bruehl, Hannah Arendt, 105.  
16 Hannah Arendt, The Jew as Pariah: Jewish Identity and Politics in the Modern Age, 1st 
Evergreen edition, ed. Ron Feldman (New York: Grove Press: distributed by Random House, 
1978). 
17 Ibid., xlii.  
18 Ibid.   19	  Ibid.	  	  
20 Sharon Muller, “The Origins of Eichmann in Jerusalem: Hannah Arendt’s Interpretation of 
Jewish History,” Jewish Social Studies 43, no. 3/4 (July 1, 1981): 237–54.  
21 Muller, “The Origins of Eichmann,” 237.  
 10 
Along a similar vein, Dagme Barnouw’s 1990 book, Visible Spaces: Hannah Arendt and 
the German-Jewish Experience,22 asserted that Arendt’s Jewish writings are an integral and 
defining part of Arendt’s entire theoretical corpus. Barnouw’s book, although not exclusively 
about the Eichmann controversy, proposed its own interpretation of the Eichmann debate in 
terms of a clash of contending notions of the diasporic Jew. As Barnouw explained, “my 
discussion of Arendt's analysis of the Eichmann trial focuses on the misunderstandings it 
engendered. These misunderstandings— psychologically motivated deliberate misreadings— are 
symptomatic of the problems she addressed in her critical discussions of the many different 
forms of assimilationism."23 Barnouw, then, should be credited for trying to understand why 
Arendt’s work was so particularly controversial in the Jewish community. Richard Bernstein’s 
1996 book, Hannah Arendt and the Jewish Question, essentially continued Barnouw’s line of 
thought, adding detail but also forcefully asserting that “a split between Arendt’s Jewish 
concerns and the rest of her work is untenable.”24 It is significant that these scholars have 
resituated the text within a larger Jewish history, for it is clear Arendt’s report is not only a 
matter of political theory. As these scholars have argued, Arendt’s understanding of Jewish 
history has a critical bearing on her political thought.  
Rather than stressing the way Arendt’s work implicitly engages Jewish identity and its 
allegiances, some scholars have argued that Arendt’s work was controversial precisely because it 
seemed to eschew a Jewish approach. In other words, these scholars understand the controversy 
as a reaction against the way Arendt placed Eichmann’s crimes outside a specifically Jewish 
context, supposedly making his crimes “universal.” As these scholars have argued, the report 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Dagmar Barnouw, Visible Spaces: Hannah Arendt and the German-Jewish Experience (Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1998). 
23 Ibid., 224.  
24 Bernstein, Hannah Arendt, 9.  
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embroiled the Jewish community in controversy because Arendt’s writing seemed to universalize 
a specifically Jewish history. Dan Diner’s 1997 article, “Hannah Arendt Reconsidered,” for 
example, identified Arendt’s “radical universalism” as an approach that clashed with other 
“narratives of Jewish experience and self-understanding.”25 For Diner, Arendt’s supposed 
“universality” exacerbated tensions in Jewish identity, creating a moment of “Jewish self-
reflection” for those involved in the controversy. More specifically, because Arendt was both 
Jewish and engaged in such “radical universalism,” Diner argued that Arendt’s report revisited a 
debate about “Jewish self-conception” that is “torn between a radical universalist, humanistic 
horizon on the one hand, and particularist resistances on the other.”26 For Diner, Arendt thus 
provoked controversy because she tested and unsettled tensions in Jewish identity, tensions 
between the “universal” and the particularly Jewish frame of mind.   
Other scholars have emphasized that Arendt did not simply attempt to place the 
Holocaust outside a particularly Jewish history, but that she did so in such a way that aroused 
suspicions about her true intentions. For these scholars, Arendt’s tone raised questions of her 
loyalties, inciting controversy particularly in the Jewish community. Richard Wolin’s 1996 
article, “The Ambivalences of German-Jewish Identity: Hannah Arendt in Jerusalem,” stressed 
that Arendt’s critics most profoundly took issue with her stunningly “cold” approach. Wolin 
explained that Arendt was so controversial because she seemed to refuse identification with the 
Jews, her own people.27 Moreover, Arendt’s apparent betrayal of loyalty and identity is not 
something Wolin himself would disagree with. In fact, he emphasizes Arendt’s own 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Dan Diner and Rita Bashaw, “Hannah Arendt Reconsidered: On the Banal and the Evil in Her 
Holocaust Narrative,” New German Critique, no. 71 (April 1, 1997): 178, doi:10.2307/488563.  
26 Diner, “Hannah Arendt Reconsidered,” 190.  
27 Richard Wolin, “The Ambivalences of German-Jewish Identity: Hannah Arendt in Jerusalem,” 
History and Memory 8, no. 2 (October 1, 1996): 9–34. 
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“ambiguous” biographical experience as a German-Jew, claiming that “by emphasizing the 
‘universal’ constituents of the Final Solution at the expense of their specifically German 
qualities, she also managed to avoid implicating her country of origin— and thereby, in an act of 
narcissistic self protection, herself."28 Although Wolin’s analysis adds insight into the reasons 
behind the controversy and into Arendt’s own biases, he ultimately serves not to historicize 
Eichmann in Jerusalem but rather to engage in the very debate Arendt and her critics underwent 
during the Eichmann Controversy. Rather than examining the importance of the controversy, in 
other words, Wolin almost participates in it. Wolin concluded with the very argument Arendt’s 
critics used against her in the 1960s: that Arendt was both wrong and motivated by sympathy for 
her German, rather than her Jewish, identity.   
Wolin’s failure to escape the terms of the original debate is a problem that has seeped 
into other studies on Arendt and her work in Eichmann in Jerusalem. Many other scholars have 
failed to understand Arendt’s work beyond the interpretation posed by her critics during the 
Eichmann controversy. More specifically, scholarship on Arendt has frequently misinterpreted 
her work as “the cornerstone of the so-called ‘functionalist’ interpretation of Auschwitz,”29 an 
interpretation of Arendt in part birthed by her critics during the Eichmann debate. For example, 
Dan Diner described the Eichmann controversy as the battle between a functionalist and 
intentionalist understanding of history, also phrasing it as competing interpretations of modern 
evil in terms of “banalities” or “monstrosities.” It is the larger, interpretive implication involved 
in Arendt’s claims that make this moment controversial, for as Diner explained, “the one—the 
functional—pleads criminal negligence, while the other—the intentionalist—pleads guilty.”30 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Ibid., 28.  
29 Ibid., 24.  
30 Diner, “Hannah Arendt Reconsidered,” 9.  
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While functionalists understand the policy of the “Final Solution” to have had some utilitarian 
rationale, intentionalists argue that the policy to exterminate Jews began with fierce anti-
Semitism and ideological fervor. In other words, while functionalists believe the policy of the 
“Final Solution” began as a means to an end, intentionalists believe this policy began as the end 
in itself. Although Wolin and others have situated Arendt as the “cornerstone” of the 
functionalist approach, other scholars like political theorist Seyla Benhabib and German historian 
Roland Schindler have pointed out that “Arendt’s theory occupies a middle ground between 
‘functionalist’ patterns of explanation…and ‘intentionalist’ accounts…According to Arendt, the 
concept of an ‘objective enemy’ did not serve an economic end but fortified the political purpose 
of total mastery and domination at which the Nazi regime aimed.”31 Framing the debate in terms 
of a clash between functionalism and intentionalism is thus misleading, for it relies on a 
misinterpretation of Arendt’s “banality” thesis. Categorizing Arendt as a “functionalist” 
misinterprets Arendt’s Eichmann in Jerusalem in two ways: first, Arendt’s “banality” thesis does 
not mean that she disregarded the role of ideology and anti-Semitism in motivating the Final 
Solution. Rather, Arendt described how anti-Semitism oriented and maintained the “banal” 
thinking that lead to Eichmann’s crimes. Second, Arendt’s “banality” thesis described Eichmann 
in particular and was not meant to describe the entire Nazi system. Arendt never wanted to use 
“banality” as a larger theory of the Nazi system. In fact, Arendt was skeptical about these larger 
interpretive theories because she thought they limited the possibilities of understanding the past. 
Thus, this binary of interpretation between “functionalist” and “intentionalist” misleadingly 
places Arendt as a “functionalist” when, perhaps, she should not be in the binary at all.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Roland W. Schindler, “Hannah Arendt und die Historiker-Konstroverse um die ‘Rationalitat’ 
der Judenvernichtung,’ in Dialektik (Frankfurt: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1994), 146-160. Excerpted 
and translated in Seyla Benhabib, The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt, Revised edition 
(Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003), 96.  
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This misinterpretation has remained a trend in Holocaust scholarship. With his 1997 
Hitler’s Willing Executioners,32 for example, Daniel Goldhagen helped renew this binary by 
framing his book as an intentionalist response to the functionalist approach he ascribes to Arendt, 
historian Raul Hilberg, and historian Christopher Browning. Goldhagen categorized Arendt as a 
“functionalist” because he, too, misinterprets her “banality” thesis. Like her Jewish critics in the 
1960s, Goldhagen understands Arendt’s “banality” thesis as an attempt both to characterize 
Nazis as simply obedient, robotic bureaucrats and to downplay the role intentionally murderous 
and anti-Semitic ideology played in the implementation of the Final Solution. With Politics, 
Philosophy, Terror (1999), political theorist Dana Villa has done in incredible job in explaining 
why Goldhagen’s book continued to misunderstand Arendt’s book in the same way her critics 
had in the 1960s. According to Villa, “many thought (and evidently still think) that Arendt 
lessened Eichmann's guilt by turning him into a mere 'cog' of the Nazi extermination machine (a 
notion she explicitly and repeatedly refutes in her trial report). Such misunderstandings have 
been given new life thanks to the debate spurred by Daniel Goldhagen's book, Hitler's Willing 
Executioners.”33 Goldhagen’s broader point was that “studies of the Holocaust have been marred 
by a poor understanding and an under-theorizing of anti-Semitism,”34 but Goldhagen used 
Arendt’s supposed “functionalism” as his counterpoint. In the end, this vein of historiography 
does not move our understanding of the controversy forward. Rather, these thinkers tend to adopt 
and reproduce the terms of the debate rather than derive new meaning from them.  
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  Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, Hitler’s Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the 
Holocaust, 1st Vintage books ed (New York: Vintage Books, 1997). 	  
33 Dana Villa, Politics, Philosophy, Terror (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1999), 6.  
34 Goldhagen, Hitler’s Willing Executioners, 7.  
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Thus, Goldhagen and Wolin revisited the controversy only to argue against their 
understanding of Arendt, but this understanding is both incorrect and simply a reiteration of what 
her critics had to say in the 1960s. However, many scholars have approached the topic not in 
order to rehash the debate but to contextualize the stakes it involved. With respect to scholarship 
specific to the memory of the Holocaust, many thinkers have identified this moment as a turning 
point in the public’s willingness to discuss the murder of the Jews. With her 1992 article, “The 
Eichmann Trial, The Jewish Question, and the American-Jewish Intelligentsia,” Pnina Lahav 
argued that Arendt, by publicizing the trial, essentially forced the American Jewish population to 
confront questions that had hitherto been avoided, explaining that the controversy was so 
emotional because it was the first time this sensitive subject had been discussed publicly in 
America.35 In The Holocaust in American Life, Peter Novick echoed Lahav’s argument, 
explaining that through the Eichmann trial the Holocaust became an event in and of itself, 
something to be considered as distinct from other Nazi barbarisms.36 Arendt, Novick explained, 
raised the stakes of this “new” conversation by writing her text before a Gentile audience. The 
Jews now had to consider, and try to themselves construct, American perceptions of the 
Holocaust.  
 It is only once the Holocaust became a focus of public conversation that, as Lahav and 
Novick have noted, its memory became a way to construct a political narrative. As Novick 
remarked, “the holocaust came to be regularly invoked—indeed brandished as a weapon—in 
American Jewry's struggles on behalf of an embattled Israel.”37 Novick, in fact, stressed that the 
controversy in large part was a battle of narratives, narratives that were used as political tools 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Pnina Lahav, “Eichmann Trial, The Jewish Question, and the American-Jewish Intelligentsia, 
The,” Boston University Law Review 72 (1992): 555. 
36 Peter Novick, The Holocaust in American Life (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1999). 
37 Ibid.,154.  
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with which to further specific interests. In his 2004 article, “Eichmann in New York: The New 
York Intellectuals and the Hannah Arendt Controversy,” Anson Rabinbach explored more deeply 
the political aims behind American Jewry’s Holocaust narrative, explaining that the dispute rose 
at a crucial juncture of their political success in America that was threatened by the potential for 
Arendt’s provocative portrait of the Holocaust to inflame anti-Semitism.38 Relying on Alexander 
Bloom’s 1986 history of New York Jews, Prodigal Sons: The New York Intellectuals and Their 
World,39 Rabinbach provided a compelling understanding of the social and political stakes 
behind the controversy. In this way, Rabinbach’s article is especially notable in its attempt to 
focus on the American controversy itself, helping to build an understanding of its significance 
outside of its specific bearings on Arendt’s scholarship.  
 Like Novick and Rabinbach, Steven Aschheim has also helped to articulate the stakes of 
the controversy with his introduction to Hannah Arendt in Jerusalem,40 a collection of essays 
that document the first conference on Arendt in Jerusalem (1997). While Novick and Rabinbach 
illuminated the importance of the debate in America, Aschheim primarily focused on the Israeli 
response to Arendt’s work. Aschheim explained that Arendt was controversial precisely because 
she refused all categories, isms, and loyalties.”41 Indeed, for Aschheim Arendt’s ambiguous 
relationship to her own Jewishness was precisely what “rendered her challenges and the 
responses to them particularly charged, emotionally overdetermined.”42 By explaining the 
controversy in terms of her perceived disloyalty to her Jewish identity, Aschheim helped 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Anson Rabinbach, “Eichmann in New York: The New York Intellectuals and the Hannah 
Arendt Controversy,” October 108 (April 1, 2004): 97–111. 
39 Alexander Bloom, Prodigal Sons: The New York Intellectuals and Their World, First Printing 
edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986). 
40 Steven E. Aschheim, ed., Hannah Arendt in Jerusalem (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 2001). 
41 Ibid., 4.  
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refashion a historical understanding of Arendt’s Jewish legacy, but also helped reveal how 
Arendt continues to be a controversial figure for the Jewish identity today. As Aschheim 
explained, it is a telling fact that Hannah Arendt’s Eichmann in Jerusalem was not translated into 
Hebrew until 2000.43  
Yet, while these scholars have done an impressive job at historicizing the debate and 
explaining why it was so controversial, many scholars often fail to go beyond an explication of 
the perspectives that clashed. They fail, that is, in explaining that the controversy not only 
collided opposing approaches, but also that the controversy challenged and affected the 
approaches themselves. One cannot stop, like historian Hans Mommsen did in his article in 
Aschheim’s collection of essays, Hannah Arendt in Jerusalem, at the understanding that “Arendt 
challenged the predominant interpretation of the origins and the implementation of the genocide 
and in doing so broke long-cherished political taboos.”44 The controversy cannot be fully 
understood by identifying the fact that opposing perspectives confronted each other, as 
Mommsen did here by framing it as Arendt’s challenging interpretation versus “long-cherished 
political taboos.” The controversy must be considered not only for what opposing perspectives it 
brought together, but also how the controversy impacted these views and subsequently built new 
ones in its wake. Histories like Mommsen’s fail to account for the full importance of the 
controversy by neglecting to examine its effect on the perspectives embroiled in the debate.  
 It is also important to acknowledge the enormous contribution made by feminist 
reinterpretations of Arendt’s legacy. Contrary to “‘standard’ readings of Arendt that categorize 
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44 Hans Mommsen, “Hannah Arendt's Interpretation of the Holocaust as a Challenge to Human 
Existence: The Intellectual Background,” in Hannah Arendt in Jerusalem, ed. Steven Aschheim 
(Berkeley: University of Califronia Press, 2001), 225.  
 18 
her as a classical philosopher,”45 some feminist thinkers have shifted their understanding of 
Arendt not as a thinker nostalgic for the Greek tradition and therefore ill-equipped to meet the 
modern world, but rather as a distinctly modern thinker, one who disrupts and challenges our 
traditions of thinking rather than blindly extolling them. Bonnig Honig, the author of Political 
Theory and the Displacement of Politics (1993) and the editor of Feminist Interpretations of 
Hannah Arendt (1995), argued such a reading of Arendt, explaining that “Arendt’s account of 
politics, law, and institutions is, like Nietzsche’s devoted to the preservation of the contest. Like 
Nietszche, she admires the agon and seeks to protect it from closure, from domination by any 
one idea, truth, essence, individual, or institution.”46 For thinkers like Honig, Arendt’s theories 
promote resistibility and contestation rather than consensus and agreement as the cornerstone of 
politics. Influenced by this feminist intervention, political theorist Seyla Benhabib is a central 
figure in Arendt scholarship. Benhabib has done a stunning job in her work The Reluctant 
Modernism of Hannah Arendt, forcefully arguing for Arendt’s “reluctant modernism” rather than 
her supposed nostalgia, as the title of her book suggests. Benhabib has done the best work to date 
in explaining Arendt’s nuanced approach to the problems of the twentieth century. As Benhabib 
argued, “Modernity, for Hannah Arendt, was not a seamless historical development but a process 
rich in contradictions.”47 Lastly, philosopher and feminist theorist Judith Butler has contributed 
greatly to the scholarship on Arendt by refashioning her thought as a way to confront 
contemporary Jewish debates. In her 2012 book, Parting Ways: Jewishness and the Critique of 
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Zionism,48 Judith Butler uses Arendt’s theoretical legacy in order to address the problem that “if 
one openly and publicly criticizes Israeli state violence, then one is sometimes, and in certain 
circumstances almost always, considered anti-Semitic or anti-Jewish.”49 Butler reinterprets 
Arendt’s approach to Judaism in order to promote a certain “Jewishness” that would break down 
demands for unyielding loyalty and loosen the possibilities of Jewish discourse. Butler continues 
to highlight the disruptive nature of Arendt’s thinking, but she also takes a step further than 
Honig and Benhabib by refashioning Arendt’s legacy in order to confront a contemporary 
problem.    
Finally, it is important to note that in the past few years—with scholars such as David 
Cesarini, Deborah Lipstadt, and most recently Bettina Stangneth—scholarship has renewed its 
interest in the Eichmann trial.50 Their focus is not on Arendt’s controversy or larger importance, 
but rather on a re-interpretation of Eichmann’s character. That is to say, in avoiding and in fact 
redoing Arendt’s characterization of Eichmann, these scholars are rejecting Arendt’s larger 
interpretive theory. As Cesarini put it, Arendt’s “universalization of Eichmann was useful in a 
Cold War context, associating him with Soviet totalitarianism, but its value has faded and now 
seems arcane. … Thanks in large part to the debate over Hitler's Willing Executioners, attention 
can be turned to Eichmann as a person."51 In their separate analysis of Eichmann, these scholars 
have above all emphasized that he was a fierce anti-Semite and hardly the banal, obedient 
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character Arendt portrayed him to be—in this sense, these scholars are arguing against an 
incorrect assumption that Arendt used banal to mean that Eichmann simply followed orders. 
Particularly because Bettina Stangneth’s work painstakingly consulted the Sassen papers—which 
contain Eichmann’s “unpublished memoir, ‘The Others Spoke, Now Will I Speak,’ and an 
interview conducted over many months with a Nazi journalist and war criminal, Willem 
Sassen”52—some have come to believe that Arendt was wrong about Eichmann because she did 
not have access to these sources, that she was misled by Eichmann’s façade of the bureaucrat and 
therefore ignored his deeper, more hateful character.   
There is a problem with this trend in scholarship. First, as Hannah Arendt scholar Roger 
Berkowitz has pointed out, we must “admit that she [Arendt] was aware of much of the most 
damning evidence Stangneth has ‘uncovered’”53 —in other words, Berkowitz questions the 
extent to which Arendt would have changed her analysis of Eichmann had she seen everything.54 
Secondly, because these scholars fundamentally misunderstand Arendt’s depiction of Eichmann 
as a “dim-witted bureaucrat, a cog in the machinery of destruction,”55 as Cesarani put it, these 
scholars wholly avoid a confrontation with what Arendt really meant by banality and 
thoughtlessness. Lipstadt declared that Stangneth has “shattered” Arendt, but ultimately this 
debate must be viewed as a distraction for the real issue at hand in this study: how Arendt and 
her critics engaged and challenged each other during the controversy.  It also must be noted that, 
50 years after the trial, these scholars have in some ways reignited the debate that immediately 
surrounded Arendt’s publication—they, too, are eager to “debunk” Arendt. Indeed, by 	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continuing to argue against this false representation of Arendt’s argument, these scholars fail to 
engage the real issues Arendt raised.  
In conclusion, this study hopes to consider and unite the broad array of interpretations of 
the event, but to also consider aspects of the debate previous scholarship has not. It seems there 
are plenty of histories of what Eichmann in Jerusalem means, but, generally speaking, this 
history has not been adequately extended to a consideration of the reaction to the text. Moreover, 
while there are many studies that address the controversy within the scope of larger arguments 
about Arendt or Holocaust historiography, there are fewer studies that understand the 
controversy as a subject in itself. Most often the scholarship that has examined the controversy 
fails to consider the full import of both sides of the Eichmann debate. On the one hand, Arendt 
supporters and theorists have done great work in helping to unpack what Arendt really meant to 
say in Eichmann in Jerusalem, yet their evaluation of her critics’ response is often prematurely 
ended simply by labeling Arendt critics’ perspectives as a collection of misinterpretations. Yet, 
as this study will argue, the responses are important not because they “miss the point” but 
because they themselves engaged Arendt’s ideas and helped to construct new understandings of 
the Holocaust. On the other hand, Arendt’s scholarly critics have continued to avoid a 
confrontation of Arendt’s book in its full meaning, precluding an engagement with her ideas by 
ascribing a pre-established, misleading representation to Arendt’s work.  
This study hopes to understand the full significance of this event as a watershed of 
change in conceptions and understandings of the Holocaust, and by extension, its implications 
for Jewish identity and discourse in the modern world. This study will consider the meaning and 
impact of the ideas circulated over the course of the debate, identifying both the points at which 
these contending approaches clash and the points at which they engage and talk to each other. 
 22 
This study will consider the importance of viewing the controversy as a conversation rather than 
simply a rigid dichotomy. In failing to see how each side communicated with the other, scholars 
sometimes themselves reinforce the rigidity of this division, either by emphasizing only the 
difference between each side or by defending one position over another. Viewing this 
controversy as a conversation will also allow this study to examine not only how pre-existing 
perspectives clashed in the debate, but also how these perspectives were in turn changed by this 
encounter. The controversy did not simply present opposing views, but built up new views as a 
result. In short, this study will examine the social reality of an idea.  
There are questions that remain to be answered, questions that bear enormous importance 
on the central concepts of modernity. How did the controversy provide an opportunity for the 
formation of a public memory of the Holocaust? How did Arendt’s text and its response 
construct new meanings of modernity, identity, and evil? What pre-existing conceptions did 
these theories challenge? How did the controversy itself build new understandings of Jewish 
history and identity?  
 This study consulted a variety of primary sources from the controversy. First, this study 
examined the public responses to Arendt’s work, most notably in reading both her critics’ and 
supporters’ articles in publications like The New Yorker, The New York Times, Dissent, Partisan 
Review and Jewish Frontier. Secondly, this study examined the Hannah Arendt Papers, a 
collection of letters, newspaper clippings and unpublished manuscripts at the Library of 
Congress. Although this study primarily focuses on the public face of the controversy, Arendt’s 
private correspondence was particularly helpful in revealing how Arendt’s original intention was 
quickly swept away from her over the course of the controversy—in other words, the comparison 
between Arendt’s public and private engagement in the controversy lends itself to an analysis of 
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how the public nature of the debate informed and warped its conclusions. The sources from The 
Hannah Arendt Papers did not present any material that was “new,” as many scholars have 
consulted these same documents. In this sense, this study hopes not to discover new sources but 
to revisit the pre-existing ones for new meaning not hitherto engaged.  
 In order to examine the controversy in its full scope, Chapter 1 of this study will explore 
the social, political and historical concerns at stake in the controversy. Arendt’s report was so 
controversial because it circulated a seemingly dangerous understanding of the Holocaust at the 
very moment that the public memory of the Holocaust was up for debate. More specifically, 
Arendt’s critics interpreted her “banality” thesis as a way to downplay Eichmann’s responsibility 
for the murder of six million Jews, while her discussion of the Jewish council’s behavior during 
the war was interpreted as a way to both obscure and tarnish the sanctity of Jewish victimhood. 
Because Arendt’s work was understood to be dangerous in its potential to circulate an anti-
Semitic portrait of the Holocaust, Arendt’s critics demanded a flood of Holocaust scholarship 
that would help to contest Arendt’s report. That is to say, this controversy became a site of 
negotiation for the formation of a delineated memory of the Holocaust.  
Chapter 2 of this study will focus on the relationship between identity and memory over 
the course of the controversy. Because the controversy debated Arendt’s violations of an 
appropriate approach to the Holocaust, the controversy was centrally about how one could 
approach this memory as a Jew. More specifically, this chapter explores how the controversy 
was not only a site of memory formation, but also a site of identity formation. The vicious 
reaction to Arendt’s supposed betrayal and self-hatred helped delineate a standard for the social 
expectations demanded of a Jew in the post-Holocaust world.  
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Chapter 3 of this study will re-examine the controversy through Arendt’s eyes, analyzing 
its impact and efficacy in challenging our approach to the Holocaust. Because Arendt privately 
revealed that she did not believe the controversy to be a “real” one, this chapter will re-employ 
Arendt’s own perspective on the controversy as a way to reconsider its efficacy. In using “Arendt 
contra Arendt,” this chapter hopes to reveal dimensions of the debate that not only Arendt, but 
also her critics, failed to appreciate at the time. Chapter 3 concludes that the Eichmann 
controversy was indeed a “real” one, not only because it provoked a watershed of scholarship on 
the Holocaust, but also because both sides of the debate strongly argued for the importance of 
continually providing opportunities to contest, challenge and renegotiate the public memory of 
the Holocaust.  
This study ends with a reflection on writing the history of this controversy. In 
disagreement with Arendt, this study believes the Eichmann controversy was a “real” 
controversy: it provoked a new and wider discussion in America, but also provided opportunities 
for further challenges to these hard questions. Using Arendt’s own understanding of the role of 
the storyteller—of the historian or the poet, of those who tell the past—this study will examine 
the importance of retelling the narrative of the controversy in order to preserve and engage the 
ways in which it encouraged effective public discourse. Part of the perceived failure of the 
controversy is not only in what happened, but also in how we tell its story. It is ultimately up to 
the historian to reexamine the importance of the controversy, presenting it to the world as a way 
to reveal the contestation of perspectives, but also as a way to continue challenging our ways of 
thinking about the Holocaust.
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Chapter 1 
Building a Memory Through Controversy 
 
On May 20, 1960, Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion announced that Adolf 
Eichmann had been found and captured by the Mossad in Argentina: Eichmann was to be 
brought to trial by an Israeli court. The world erupted with a mixture of excitement and anxiety. 
Had Israel breached international customs of war crime trials by kidnapping Eichmann? Should 
he be tried in an international court—as with the International Military Tribunal presiding over 
the Nuremberg Trials (1945-1946)—or was it Israel’s right to bring the Nazi who facilitated the 
Final Solution to justice? How can justice be found when faced with the enormity and 
unprecedented character of Eichmann’s crimes?  
After the defeat of Nazi Germany, the international community began the work of 
understanding and prosecuting Nazi war crimes, including Hitler’s extensive plan to exterminate 
the Jews. Adolf Eichmann had escaped Germany shortly after the war, yet he remained a figure 
of great preoccupation. Eichmann seemed to be a symbolic figure for the catastrophe enacted 
upon the European Jews. Eichmann was the expert on the “Jewish Question” for the S.S., 
ultimately becoming the logistical manager of the consolidation, movement, and deportation of 
Jews across Europe to concentration and extermination camps. His job, in a word, facilitated and 
made possible the Holocaust, and thus Israel, as the de facto representative of the international 
Jewish community, felt it was their duty to put him on trial. As Chief Prosecutor for the trial 
Gideon Hausner put it, “there was only one man who had ever been almost entirely concerned 
with the Jews, whose business had been almost entirely with the Jews, whose business had been 
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their destruction.”1 Eichmann was the Nazi who made the Holocaust possible, and the Jewish 
people were eager to see him brought to justice.  
The Israeli court proceedings relied heavily on the Nuremberg precedent, and Eichmann 
was brought to trial under the Nazi Collaboration (Punishment) Law of 1950, a retroactive law 
that relied upon the precedent established by the Nuremberg Trials and its 1945 charter.2 Yet, 
while the Nuremberg Trials addressed a variety of Nazi war crimes, Eichmann’s trial took on a 
more focused subject, for “this time ‘the tragedy of Jewry as a whole was to be the central 
concern.’”3 It was time to focus on the Shoah by itself, distinct from the rest of the atrocities of 
National Socialism. With such an agenda, “the Eichmann trial was one of the major news events 
in 1961, attracting the attention of an overwhelming majority of Americans…. Gallup Poll data 
indicate that 87 per cent of adult Americans had heard or read about the trial and that almost 
three-fourths were very or fairly interested in it.”4 
 Yet, from its outset, the Eichmann trial brought up more problems than it solved, and the 
prosecution of Eichmann proved to be far from a straightforward affair. First, Eichmann’s direct 
yet distanced role in the Final Solution promised to be a difficult crime to investigate, for, as 
Hannah Arendt noted, “Eichmann… had never committed an overt act [of killing]… it was an 
important point; it touched upon the very essence of this crime, which was no ordinary crime, 
and the very nature of this criminal, who was no common criminal; by implication, it also took 
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cognizance of the weird fact that in the death camps it was usually the inmates and the victims 
who had actually wielded ‘the fatal instrument with [their] own hands.’”5  
Although faced with the complexities of Eichmann’s peculiar role in the Nazi 
bureaucracy, initial reports about Eichmann’s capture focused on concerns about the legal 
proceedings of the proposed trial, and, as historian Peter Novick notes, "in the first weeks after 
Ben-Gurion's announcement, newspaper editorials, by a margin of more than two to one, were 
negative in one way or another."6  Beyond debates of Israel’s right to conduct the trail in the 
place of an international court, reports expressed concerns about the specific charge against 
Eichmann: “crimes against the Jewish people” rather than “crimes against humanity.” A lawyer 
at the Nuremberg Trials, Telford Taylor, took particular issue with the manner in which this 
charge disregarded the Nuremberg precedent, writing in January 1961 for the New York Times 
that “to define a crime in terms of religion or nationality of the victim, instead of the nature of 
the criminal act, is wholly out of keeping with the needs of the times and the trend of modern 
law.”7  Israeli Prime Minister Ben-Gurion, for one, anticipated this argument, arguing that it 
implicitly denies that Jews belong to the category of “humanity.” Writing in a 1960 New York 
Times article, Ben-Gurion noted, “Now I see it argued…[that] Eichmann's crime, in its enormity, 
was against humanity and the conscience of humanity rather than against Jews as such. Only a 
Jew with an inferiority complex could say that: only one who does not reason that a Jew is a 
human being.'"8 
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 Yet, precisely because Eichmann’s crime was both incredibly painful to revisit and so 
difficult to legally categorize, the trial triggered a flood of other questions left largely 
unanswered in the wake of the Holocaust—larger questions about the Holocaust as opposed to 
simply Eichmann’s role in it.  Elie Wiesel, survivor and prominent writer, for example, took the 
trial as an opportunity to point out the failure of the international Jewish community to do more 
to stop the murder of so many of their people. In particular, Wiesel was outraged that the 
Palestinian and “American Jewish community never made use of its political and financial 
powers” to stop the catastrophe, and he therefore declared that “for the trial to have been 
conducted on its right moral plane— the plane of absolute truth—the prosecutor, Gideon 
Hausner (or Ben-Gurion himself as Witness), should have bowed his head and cried out in a 
voice loud enough to be heard by three generations: Before judging others, let us look into our 
own errors, our own weaknesses. We never attempted the impossible—we never exhausted the 
possible."9 In what ironically foreshadowed the Arendt Controversy, Wiesel’s attempt to 
condemn international Jewish complicity resulted in harsh responses in the letters to the editor of 
his 1961 Commentary piece, with one reviewer accusing him of destroying “the conventional 
distinction between the categories of criminal, onlooker, and victim.”10 More importantly, 
however, what Wiesel and others demonstrated in their response to the trial was the extent to 
which the American Jewish community had yet to tackle the painful problems confronting them 
after the Holocaust—thus the particular conundrum Eichmann presented to the public was less 
how to prosecute his role in the Holocaust than it was how to negotiate what larger 
understanding of the Holocaust would frame his deeds.  	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Although Eichmann was hanged on May 31, 1962, his death was by no means the end of 
the debate. The publication of Arendt’s report on the trial, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on 
the Banality of Evil (1963), in both its five-part series in The New Yorker (beginning in Feb. of 
1963) and the subsequent book combining those parts, ignited a storm across the Jewish 
community and beyond. The controversy in America provoked by Arendt’s five-part series was, 
according to historian Anson Rabinbach, “certainly the most bitter public dispute among 
intellectuals and scholars concerning the Holocaust that has ever taken place.”11 In her book, 
Arendt had not only painted the court proceedings as a “show trial,” but she also had called 
Eichmann banal at the same time she ventured to question the role Jewish leaders had in their 
own peoples’ destruction. In America, although the Israeli community would play its role, the 
Jewish debate was particularly vicious and long-winded. Upon reflection two decades later, 
prominent Jewish thinker Irving Howe would call the early 60s a “civil war” amongst the New 
York intellectual elite.12 Even in September 1963, Jewish writer for Commentary Norman 
Podhoretz pleaded with the American Jewish community to conduct the debate on less 
acrimonious terms: “the Nazis destroyed a third of the Jewish people. In the name of all that is 
humane, will the remnant never let up on itself?”13 He was, however, not soon to be done with 
the rift.  
Many of the American Jewish intellectuals—most notably Lionel Abel, Irving Howe, 
Marie Syrkin, Daniel Bell, and Dwight Macdonald—participated in the controversy for years. 
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However, the controversy was not limited to the Jewish community, for people like Judge 
Michael A. Musmanno and Arendt’s close friend Mary McCarthy would greatly contribute to the 
fabric of the debate. Beginning with the first installment of Arendt’s New Yorker series in 
February 1963, these intellectuals debated Arendt’s controversial ideas publicly through a variety 
of means. In addition to writing articles in publications like Partisan Review, The New York 
Times, Commentary, and Dissent, these thinkers also participated in a broad array of public 
forums sponsored by Jewish organizations, broadening the conversation beyond the bounds of 
this group of Jewish intellectuals.  Moreover, one of the central events that prolonged the 
controversy was the 1965 publication of Jacob Robinson’s And the Crooked Shall be Made 
Straight, a book written with the sole purpose of refuting Arendt’s arguments virtually line-by-
line.  
  Why did Arendt’s report on the Eichmann trial ignite such a fierce and long-lasting 
controversy in America, particularly among the American Jewish community? What specific 
points in her work were met with the most opposition, and what do her critics’ reactions reveal 
about the post-Holocaust mood in America? How did Arendt and her critics take different 
approaches to the construction of a delineated memory of the Holocaust, and what happened 
when these two approaches collided?  
 Arendt’s critics considered her report dangerous because her argument seemed, on the 
one hand, to diminish the blame of Eichmann and anti-Semitism for their part in the Final 
Solution, and on the other hand, to obscure and tarnish the sanctity of Jewish victimhood. Her 
report, “with its potential boomerangs,”14 was so controversial because it threatened to circulate 
a dangerous, potentially anti-Semitic portrait of the Holocaust at the very moment the public 	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memory of the Holocaust was up for debate. It could even be said that the anxiety surrounding 
Arendt’s apparent argument—and its possibility to further inflame anti-Semitism— was itself the 
catalyst for the flood of public debates about what narrative the memory of the Holocaust should 
adopt. In response to the danger of Arendt, her critics were forced to themselves construct a 
public understanding of the Holocaust through their engagement with, and primarily refutation 
of, her work.  
The controversy thus certainly transcended an empirical debate—it was a battle that 
sought to understand how one might understand and discuss morality, justice and truth in the 
face of the death of six million Jews. Furthermore, Eichmann in Jerusalem became the prism 
through which these matters were debated. Although the manner in which individuals 
approached the book was informed by these larger questions, the argument was in large part 
ensconced in quarrels over the book’s content. That Arendt’s book was deeply ambiguous 
certainly contributed to such quarrels, but this also rendered the book incredibly pliable—each 
player involved in the debate would interpret and exploit their own reading of Arendt to further 
their arguments. Implicit and explicit in these readings of Eichmann in Jerusalem are comments 
on how one should historicize tragedy, for the debate centered on the proper subject, style and 
frame one should use to approach the Holocaust. Arendt’s work and her critics’ response to it 
thus provided the terms upon which a site of Holocaust memory would form. 
In order to study how the response of Arendt’s work crystallized in a clash of approaches 
to the construction Holocaust memory, section 1 of this chapter will first examine the social, 
political, and historical stakes of the controversy. The controversy engendered one of the first 
public debates about how one can understand and talk about the Holocaust partly because 
Arendt’s publication raised the urgency and importance of engaging the public perception of the 
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Holocaust and its bearing on Jewish identity. Section 2 will discuss the debate surrounding 
Arendt’s understanding of Eichmann’s evil as “banal.” Her portrait of Eichmann as a clownish 
figure, incapable of thinking from the standpoint of someone else and willingly embracing the 
Nazi movement, was largely misunderstood as an intent to diminish his culpability in his crimes. 
Moreover, because Arendt’s banality thesis both stressed modernity as opposed to anti-Semitism 
and seemed to be a universally applicable theory of evil, this controversy revealed and in some 
senses provoked an anxiety about universal frameworks of understanding the Holocaust that 
could deny the specific and willful catastrophe enacted upon the Jews.  Section 3 will discuss 
how Arendt challenged the prevailing conception of evil and good, examining how her retelling 
of Jewish behavior under the conditions of Nazi terror was perceived as a narrative that 
emphasized Jewish complicity and blame rather than redemptive victimhood and martyrdom. In 
the clash of historical frameworks that converged in the debate, Arendt asserted the importance 
of understanding history not through its continuities or traditions, but rather through its ruptures 
and contingencies, challenging the extent to which her critics hoped to reimagine traditional 
frameworks in order to understand the meaning of the Holocaust and to preserve the memory of 
its victims.  
In short, the chapter hopes to go further than simply identifying what Arendt meant with 
Eichmann in Jerusalem by investigating the clash of approaches and concerns that engendered 
the controversy. This chapter also hopes to reveal what each side considered to be crucially 
important or dangerous in the retelling of the Holocaust, examining how the interaction of their 
ideas helped delineate standards of understanding its history for the future.  
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The Stakes of a Memory 
According to historian Peter Novick, the Eichmann Trial became “the first time that what 
we now call the Holocaust was presented to the American public as an entity in its own right, 
distinct from Nazi barbarism in general. In the United States, the word “Holocaust” first became 
firmly attached to the murder of European Jewry as a result of the trial.”70 Arendt’s New Yorker 
series and subsequent book in large part provoked this public debate that began the work of 
constructing a narrative of the Holocaust in and of itself. In doing so, the trial offered both an 
opportunity and a danger for the Jewish community. The struggle “among the Jewish community 
and the survivors of the Holocaust as to how and in what terms one should appropriate the 
memory of the Holocaust and its victims”71 provided the potential for cathartic and enduring 
remembrance, but this project also had the possibility of failing because it could produce a 
portrait that disrespected their peoples’ memory, that neglected to tell the “truth,” or even that 
failed to impart the proper lessons for the future. Worse, the opportunity provided by the trial 
could be used to promote anti-Semitism and to further endanger the Jews. As Peter Novick 
explained, “The ADL also worried that the trial could ‘damage the image which many people 
have of Jews as a fair-minded and merciful people.’”72 
Hannah Arendt’s book was understood to be dangerous by her Jewish critics almost 
immediately. The central danger in the report was, according to her critics, its ambiguous, if not 
anti-Semitic, portrait of the Holocaust that emphasized Jewish rather than Nazi guilt. As Jewish 
thinker Norman Podheretz put it, “in the place of the monstrous Nazi, she gives us the 'banal' 
Nazi; in the place of the Jew as a virtuous martyr, she gives us the Jew as accomplice in evil; and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 Novick, The Holocaust in American Life, 142.  
71 Benhabib, Reluctant Modernism, 180.  
72 Novick, The Holocaust in American Life, 140.  
 34 
in the place of the confrontation of guilt and innocence, she gives the 'collaboration' of criminal 
and victims.”73 The immediate anxiety surrounding Arendt’s work prompted her critics to 
anticipate its impact by denying its merits publicly, ironically serving to further circulate 
versions of her ideas and establish the debate as a long-lasting interpretive structure. Arendt had 
a point when— after the publication of Jacob Robinson’s And the Crooked Shall Be Made 
Straight, a book entirely devoted to refuting Arendt—she remarked that “Robinson's formidable 
supporters have put their whole power at the service of propagating what they were most anxious 
to avoid."74 
At the outset, her critics responded with outcry, utter refutations of her arguments, and 
condemnations of Arendt’s personal disposition, but organizations like the Anti-Defamation 
League took more active steps to prevent the book’s potential harm. On March 11, 1963, the 
organization circulated a memorandum to all regional offices about the report, hoping to provide 
“a small assist in handling some aspects of the problem that may confront you.”75 The assistance 
this memorandum provided was an interpretation or understanding of the book for its recipients, 
but the memorandum also identified the work as a dangerous and potentially long-lasting threat 
for the Jews, for Arendt had “given the world a concept about Jewish participation in the Nazi 
holocaust which may plague Jews for years to come.” The memorandum told its readers, then, 
that the book was centrally about the theory that “the Jews not only passively permitted 
themselves to be destroyed, but actually supervised the administrative details of the Final 
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Solution.”76 Although Arendt rejected this interpretation, this nonetheless became the 
predominant mode of understanding her report over the course of the controversy.   
 In the ADL’s July-August of 1963 version of their publication, Facts, the ADL went a 
step further and provided an extensive article, written by one of Arendt’s central critics, Jacob 
Robinson, about the book. Robinson was harsh on Arendt’s work, believing it to be an attempt to 
blame the Jews for their own destruction. He concluded that Arendt’s work is not only an “effort 
to minimize Eichmann’s responsibility for the deaths,” but also an attempt to suggest that “the 
acts of Jews individually or collectively…resulted in the destruction of European Jewry.”77 
Robinson calls Arendt’s suggestions “unreal and evil,” not only for its prejudiced views, but also 
because of its potential for wide circulation and acceptance across the world—after all, Arendt 
was a globally respected authority on totalitarianism by the 1960s. “To the extent that it 
[Eichmann in Jerusalem] gains acceptance as a work of unquestioned authority—and 
undermines the realities of history,” Robinson writes to his readers, “it is an evil book.”78 
 Arendt critics seemed terrified of both the specific content of Arendt’s work—they 
understood it to be a work that blames the Holocaust on the Jews themselves—and the potential 
Arendt’s work had to be widely circulated and accepted in the Gentile world. There was a 
potential, according to the critics, for a false portrait to go unquestioned. This prejudiced history 
could circulate and become the static, homogenous status quo of belief, breeding discrimination 
or violence. After the Holocaust, the possibility of violent danger in anti-Semitic discourse was 
haunting the conversation. It was, then, a controversy that did not only involve members of the 	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Jewish community. Because of the trial’s importance and Arendt’s choice of publication, the 
debate was also very much about how Gentile Americans would ultimately view the Jews during 
the Holocaust. It was not simply a battle for defining a memory amongst Jews, it was defining a 
memory for the public, for a wider audience; the political implications of that memory were 
heightened. There was a fear that Arendt’s book would inform the image of the Jew for 
Americans. For American Jewry, her ideas were not simply offensive and false, they could also 
have disastrous effects on their social and political status.   
The danger with Arendt’s work resulted from the fact that she had not only circulated 
these damning ideas to the Gentile world (via The New Yorker), but also because she herself was 
an authority on the subject. Arendt’s well-known role as a public intellectual and scholar lent her 
a great deal of credibility and authority. Her critics feared her reputation could have the result of 
rendering her work “the final word” on the subject. Thus, part of the controversy was an attempt 
to criticize Arendt’s reputation as a credible scholar, emphasizing that her work was not only 
prejudiced, but false, incorrect and a result of poor research. Judge Michael Musmanno—who 
testified at the Eichmann Trial and wrote the original review of Arendt’s book in the New York 
Times—highlighted this fact, arguing, “the disparity between what Miss Arendt states, and what 
the ascertained facts are, occurs with such disturbing frequency in her book that it can hardly be 
accepted as an authoritative historical work.”79 
 Her critics hoped to break down the potential for Arendt’s work to become the singular, 
unquestioned narrative, trying to avoid the general public from simply receiving and accepting—
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rather than contesting and challenging—her book. Jewish intellectual Irving Howe, for example, 
expressed a fear he and writer Marie Syrkin both shared:  
How many New Yorker readers… had ever before cared to read anything of the vast 
literature about Jewish resistance, martyrdom, and survival during World War II? How 
many would ever read anything about it again? … For the New Yorker does not print 
polemics, rebuttals, or qualifying comments … Her articles raised issues of the utmost 
gravity, for they contained charges against the European Jews, their institutions and 
leaders, which are certain to rouse the deepest emotions among those of us who—Jews 
who by an accident of geography—survive. These articles reached a mass audience 
almost certainly unequipped to judge them critically, a mass audience that would never 
see Lionel Abel’s devastating critique or even hear that Dr. Robinson had prepared a 
point-by-point refutation.”80  
The fact that the book was published in The New Yorker compounded their fear, for The New 
Yorker not only does not publish rebuttals, but also continued to refuse to do so over the course 
of the controversy. Arendt’s critics yearned for the chance to re-negotiate the topic with Arendt’s 
readership, particularly her Gentile one.  
 Judge Michael Musmanno worked tirelessly to publish his own reply to Arendt’s work in 
The New Yorker, especially after the its editor William Shawn wrote Musmanno had chosen to 
“misunderstand” Arendt’s book in Musmanno’s May 19, 1963 review of Eichmann in Jerusalem 
for The New York Times. Musmanno wrote several letters to Shawn within a span of a few days, 
growing increasingly frustrated that The New Yorker refused to publish a letter he had prepared 
for them. After two letters to Shawn, Judge Musmanno had clearly only become more outraged, 
writing, “I am sending the letter by certified mail so that we will have a record of its having been 
received by the New Yorker. I can thus say that I have done everything to erase a most 
objectionable, unfair and misleading attack on me, so gratuitous and wholly unnecessary.”81 
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Even the editor of the New York Times, Lester Merkel, got involved in Musmanno’s fight to open 
The New Yorker to replies, writing several letters to William Shawn about the affair. The two 
editors quibbled about allowing Musmanno to reply, but William Shawn adamantly refused. “All 
of us here at the New Yorker were dismayed,” Shawn writes to Merkel, “first by the choice of 
reviewer (after all, he was an interested party who felt he had been maligned in Miss Arendt’s 
book, and therefore should have been disqualified); second, by his practically total 
misunderstanding of Miss Arendt’s book. This was no mere matter of opinion; Musmanno was 
saying that white was black.”82 Arendt critics continued to fight for the opportunity to contest 
and challenge Arendt within the forum of The New Yorker, but Shawn decided their 
contestations were not legitimate—they were “opinions,” “false” and refusing to engage in the 
real conversation at hand. In any case, the goal of Arendt’s critics was clear: to have the 
opportunity to, in front of the Gentile public, challenge Arendt’s claims, squashing its clout 
before it takes hold in the space of men’s minds.  
The narrative of the Holocaust and its bearing on the public perception of Jews was 
fundamentally a political and social concern of the Jews after Arendt’s report. For Israeli Prime 
Minister Ben-Gurion and Prosecutor Hausner, the trial was an opportunity to educate the world 
about the horrors of anti-Semitism and, by extension, the necessity of a Jewish state to protect 
the Jewish people from a world that had always been hostile to them. For some American Jews, 
the narrative employed by Prime Minister Ben-Gurion and Gideon Hausner would be “regularly 
invoked—indeed brandished as a weapon—in American Jewry’s struggles on behalf of an 
embattled Israel.”83 Arendt would take note of this broadened scope of the trial, effectively 
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accusing Ben-Gurion of conducting a “show-trial” rather than concentrating on justice for 
Eichmann’s deeds. The opening to her book is filled with portraits of the court as a theatre, with 
staged narrative arcs and a world audience to receive them. “Whoever planned this auditorium in 
the newly built Beth Ha’am, the House of the People…had a theater in mind,” she notes. 
“Clearly, this courtroom is not a bad place for the show trial David Ben-Gurion, Prime Minister 
of Israel, had in mind …The audience was supposed to represent the whole world…[and] this 
case was built on what the Jews had suffered, not on what Eichmann had done.”84  
Arendt was perhaps not mistaken in her interpretation of the trial’s purported goal. 
Prosecutor Hausner himself declared, “It is not an individual that is in the dock at this historic 
trial, and not the Nazi regime alone, but anti-Semitism throughout history.”85 If Israel hoped to 
refashion the narrative of the Holocaust as a way to prove the need for a Jewish homeland, the 
American Jewish population also had social and political concerns about how the Holocaust 
would come to be discussed. Because the holocaust was increasingly a subject of debate in 
America—partly as a result of Arendt’s critics’ own outcry—Arendt’s critics were forced to 
reconsider the American perception of the Holocaust’s role in informing the relationship between 
Jew and non-Jew in America.  
 As historians Alexander Bloom and Anson Rabinbach have pointed out, American Jews 
had largely avoided a public confrontation with the history of the Holocaust before the trial. 
Irving Howe has pointed to this fact as a probable cause for the ferocity of the debate, explaining 
that during the controversy the “long-suppressed grief evoked by the Holocaust burst out. It was 
as if her views, which roused many of us to fury, enabled us to finally speak about the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem, 5-6.  
85 Reported in Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem, 19.  
 40 
unspeakable.”86  Moreover, historian Anson Rabinbach has argued that the trial and its 
controversy emerged at a “crucial juncture in the history of American Jewry,” for they had 
finally found themselves in a “special position...of unprecedented Jewish success” in American 
politics.87 By ironically relying upon Arendt’s comparison of Nazism and Stalinism in Origins of 
Totalitarianism before the Eichmann controversy, the Jewish elite had completed its “American 
political itinerary from the left of the 1930s to anti-Stalinism,” finding success in appealing to the 
Cold War’s paranoia about the Soviet Union.  
And yet, the burgeoning discussion of the Holocaust could threaten their political 
success, both because it revealed the extent to which American Jews had hitherto avoided the 
topic and because of the potential for a damning portrait of the Holocaust to further marginalize 
the “pariahdom” of the Jews in America. In hopes of preserving the fact that the Holocaust and 
survivors had not yet “carried the stigma of Jewish pariahdom,”88 Jewish intellectuals responded 
with fierce public outcry against Arendt’s report. As Rabinbach put it, Arendt’s report was so 
dangerous “precisely because it did not sanctify the Holocaust, because it continued to warn of 
the vulnerability of the pariah, and because it so manifestly seemed to question the virtue of 
victimhood, gave offense.”89 
The passion and emotion involved in the controversy seems understandable from the 
outset. And emotional it was. Arendt biographer Elizabeth Young-Bruehl explains that during a 
debate hosted by The Dissent in 1963 about Eichmann in Jerusalem, supporters of Arendt were 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 Irving Howe, “Mid-Century Turning Point: An Intellectual Memoir,” Midstream, June-July 
1975, 25.    
87 Rabinbach, “Eichmann in New York,” 110.  
88 Rabinbach, “Eichmann in New York,” 105.  
89 Ibid.  
 41 
“booed loudly from the audience, while Lionel Abel pounded the speaker’s table in outrage.”90 
Although Howe later refuted this portrait of the debate as exaggerated, “clearly, this controversy 
consisted of more than an agitated debate over facts, historical accuracy, and proper 
interpretation.”91 It was about defining a memory and a history that would very much inform the 
image of Jewish identity, both for Jews themselves and the communities in which they lived.  
 
The Banality of Evil  
For Arendt critics, the Holocaust was the historical example of pure evil par excellence. 
After Arendt attended the Eichmann trial, however, she found one of the most infamous Nazi 
criminals to be more of a  clownish figure than a demonic monster, subtitling her book “a Report 
on the Banality of Evil.” Since Arendt coined the phrase, “banality of evil” had been understood 
in countless different ways, its meaning endlessly stretched, distorted, misunderstood and 
employed throughout the Eichmann controversy and afterwards. In this sense, Arendt’s friend 
and prominent Jewish scholar Gershom Scholem was not far off when he criticized Arendt for 
using the phrase—“this new thesis strikes me as a catchword: it does not impress me, 
certainly.”92 And yet, the pliability of the phrase renders it an interesting fulcrum of analysis, 
joining and engaging opposing perspectives under the same term: banality.  
Arendt understood Eichmann not as a sadistic monster but rather as “terrifyingly 
normal,” a man who taught us “the lesson of the fearsome, word-and-thought defying banality of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 Elizabeth Young-Bruehl, Hannah Arendt: For Love of the World, 2nd ed. (New Haven & 
London: Yale University Press, 2004), 360.  
91 Dan Diner, and Rita Bashaw, “Hannah Arendt Reconsidered: On the Banal and the Evil in Her 
Holocaust Narrative.” New German Critique, no. 71 (April 1, 1997): 177–90. 
92 Gershom Scholem, “‘Eichmann in Jerusalem,” Encounter, January 1964, 53. Accessed 
December 3, 2014, http://www.UNZ.org/Pub/Encounter-1964jan-00051.   
 42 
evil.”93 Arendt saw something new in Eichmann, something perhaps more terrifying than the evil 
hitherto encountered. As she wrote in her notes for a lecture to her students at the University of 
Chicago in October 1963, “it were the most banal motives, not especially wicked ones (like 
sadism or wish to humiliate or will to power) which made Eichmann such a frightful evil-
doer.”94 Arendt instead described Eichmann as “thoughtless,” in the sense of lacking both the 
ability to think without the “banister” of law and the ability to think from the standpoint of 
someone else. As political theorist Dana Villa argued in 1999, “the ‘new type of criminal’ 
represented by Eichmann is neither a party fanatic nor an indoctrinated robot. Rather, he is the 
individual who participates willingly in the activities of a criminal regime, while viewing himself 
as insulated from any and all responsibility for his actions by both organization structure and the 
law.”95  
Arendt’s portrait of Eichmann emerged primarily as a reflection upon his mode of 
thinking under the Nazi system. As Arendt would later ask in Life of the Mind (1977),96 “Might 
the problem of good or evil, our faculty for telling right from wrong, be connected with our 
faculty of thought?” Arendt described Eichmann almost as if he were a twisted and failed version 
of Kant’s principles of reason. Arendt first addressed the matter when she discussed how 
Eichmann “declared with great emphasis that he had lived his whole life according to Kant’s 
moral precepts,” a comment Arendt found all too ironic, an irresistible glance into how 
Eichmann saw himself. She explained how Eichmann’s understanding of Kant’s formula— as 
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Eichmann puts it, “to act as if the principles of your actions were the same as that of the 
legislator or of the law of the land”97— was almost the opposite of what Kant had meant. Arendt, 
a thinker greatly influenced by Kant’s precepts, goes on to explain how Eichmann’s perspective 
was a gross perversion of the type of thinking Kant had described. As opposed to obedience to an 
external law, Kant explains how “every man was a legislator the moment he started to act: by 
using his ‘practical reason’ man found the principles that could and should be the principles of 
law.”98 Indeed, it was Eichmann’s own failure to exhibit a Kantian structure of thinking that 
made him banal, for it was his lack of capacity for independent thinking under Nazi totalitarian 
power that led to his crimes. He was a shallow man who could not undergo the “practical 
reasoning” that engaged the standpoints of others, someone who “instead commit themselves 
absolutely to the fictional truth of the movement.”99Arendt’s discussion here reveals more than 
Eichmann’s perverted understanding of himself—for Arendt, his failure to think independently 
and from the standpoint of others amounted to a failure to think more generally. This is what she 
calls “thoughtlessness.” 
As Arendt explains, “banality” is intended to describe the specific character of Eichmann, 
arguing that he “lacked imagination” and “merely, to put the matter colloquially, never realized 
what he was doing.”100 Arendt’s insistence that Eichmann “never realized what he was doing” is 
easily misunderstood, a statement that seems to disregard Eichmann’s knowledge of, and by 
extension responsibility for, the Final Solution. Yet, she certainly did not mean that Eichmann 
wasn’t aware of the plan to exterminate the Jews—as Arendt scholar Roger Berkowitz has 	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argued, “she [Arendt] knew that once the Fuhrer decided on physical liquidation, Eichmann 
embraced that decision. What she meant was that he acted thoughtlessly and dutifully, not as a 
robotic bureaucrat, but as part of a movement, as someone convinced that he was sacrificing an 
easy morality for a higher good.”101Arendt’s portrait of Eichmann was met almost immediately 
with backlash—Eichmann’s supposed banality did not seem to be an appropriate conclusion to 
draw when considering the unspeakable horror of his crimes. The banality of evil disrupted the 
assumption that Eichmann’s demonic nature was a given, virtually indisputable. Lionel Abel, for 
example, asked simply, “How could the man not have been morally monstruous? And all the 
more a monster if he did not know he was one!"102 
 The fact that her critics immediately rejected the phrase almost seems, upon reflection, 
“overdetermined,” for Arendt was well aware of the fact that her approach was decidedly 
opposed to “the tradition of Western thought, which saw evil in metaphysical terms as ultimate 
depravity, corruption, or sinfulness.”103 In Arendt’s lecture notes for Jewish students at the 
University of Chicago in October 1963, she explains that “banality of evil” “goes against our 
whole tradition where Lucifer is a fallen archangel (implying the worst were once the best), 
against our beliefs of the demonic nature of evil, that there is something grand in it, that it may 
have positive results.”104 One can see this clash of approaches quite well in Judge Michael 
Musmanno’s review of her book, as well as in the many letters Musmanno sent to the editor of 
The New Yorker, William Shawn during the controversy. Frustrated that Shawn wrote in The 
New Yorker’s June 1963 Notes and Comments that Musmanno had “chose[n] to misunderstand” 	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Arendt’s book, Musmanno fiercely defended his review in a letter to Shawn, calling Hitler and 
Himmler “arch-demons” and explaining that they were “the very personification of evil, that they 
represented the very dregs of humankind in the land gangsterism and murder.”105 Because 
Arendt rejected the “depravity, corruption, or sinfulness”106 of evil, Musmanno responded by 
protesting the very fact that she had, in a word, broken down a narrative of the mythic 
proportions of evil.   
This point was well noted by her audience, particularly her defenders. Hence journalist 
Richard Rhodes, writing in The Kansas City Times in June 1963, noted that Arendt was different 
from the “post-war books about the Nazis [that] read like morality plays in which Hitler is the 
Devil and his seconds the diabolic host.”107 Her supporters in fact, often celebrated her challenge 
to traditional moral frameworks. It was a welcome jolt for someone like Daniel Bell, a Jewish 
thinker and sociologist who largely supported Arendt’s arguments that seemed to remind the 
Jews the ways in which traditional forms of understanding evil fail to account for—and 
confront— the full scope of modern horror. “It would be comfortable for all of us,” he writes, if 
Eichmann was the “perverted sadist,” the “monster.”108 Indeed, Bell notes, “Then evil could 
again be seen as something ‘other,’ as something cunning, mephitic or surrealistic, the conjuring 
of literary romancers like Lautreamont who in his Chants De Ladorer narrates a ‘career of evil’ 
through the incantations of sadism. But the reality of evil, as Simone Weil once noted, is that it is 
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‘gloomy, monotonous, barren, and boring.’ Because evil, when done, is felt not as evil, but as a 
necessity or a duty. And this was the evil of Adolf Eichmann.”109 
One of the most frequently misinterpreted aspects of the “banality of evil” thesis is its 
applicability beyond Eichmann in particular.  In Eichmann in Jerusalem, Arendt maintained that 
she was judging Eichmann as an individual, not as the representative of Nazism generally, and 
would continue to emphasize during the controversy that this was her intent. “Banality” was 
meant to signal the fact that one “cannot extract any diabolical or demonic profundity from 
Eichmann,” and it does not mean that Eichmann’s evil is the typical case—and for Arendt, this 
“is still far from calling commonplace.”110 In her notes for an October 1963 lecture to her Jewish 
students at the University of Chicago, Arendt also reminds her students that “in the center of 
every criminal court proceedings, you find the accused, an individual of flesh and blood—not a 
‘system’ and not ‘history.’”111 Her judgment of Eichmann— but also the scope of her trial 
report—was specific to Eichmann. As political theorist Dana Villa reminds us, ‘The banality of 
evil’ named Eichmann’s evil, not the evil of the perpetrators or the Holocaust in general.”112  
And yet, “the banality of evil” was immediately misunderstood from her original intent, 
often represented as a general, structural theory about evil. Arendt tried to clarify her meaning in 
her January 1964 letter to prominent Jewish thinker Gershom Scholem, explaining this new 
notion of evil: 
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It is indeed my opinion now that evil is never 'radical,' that it is only extreme, and that it 
possesses neither depth nor any demonic dimension. It can overgrow and lay waste the 
whole world precisely because it spreads like a fungus on the surface. It is 'thought-
defying,' as I said, because thought tries to reach some depth, to go to the roots, and the 
moment it concerns itself with evil, it is frustrated because there is nothing. That is its 
'banality.' Only the good has depth and can be radical.113  
For Arendt, then, this evil is shallow and exists at the surface; it is rootless and therefore can be 
infectious.114 Despite this attempt at clarification, in this exchange with Scholem Arendt 
exacerbated the problem of the phrase’s misinterpretation as a general theory about evil, almost 
explicitly arguing for a new universal concept of evil despite the fact that she elsewhere rejected 
this application of “banality.” Her friend and mentor Karl Jaspers would point out this misstep in 
her exchange with Scholem. Jaspers, as did Arendt, believed that “the point is that this evil, not 
evil per se, is banal. I wasn’t altogether happy with your phrasing of this point in your response 
to Scholem. What evil is stands behind your phrase characterizing Eichmann.”115 Jaspers was 
right to express his dissatisfaction with her Encounter exchange, for she continued to give life to 
the idea that Eichmann was the prototype for a new theory on evil rather than explain her larger 
philosophical reflections were a result of her judgment of Eichmann in particular.116 The only 
general understanding one should glean from the trial, according to Arendt, was that “such 
remoteness from reality and such thoughtlessness can wreak more havoc than all the evil 
instincts taken together which, perhaps, are inherent in man… it was a lesson, neither an 
explanation of the phenomenon nor a theory about it.”117 For Arendt, Eichmann was only one 
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type of Nazi. She of course believed that Nazis could be motivated by any number of things, for 
they could be “fanatics, sadists, thugs and brutes, as well as ‘desk murderers.’”118 
Said in another way, Arendt “banality of evil” was a reflection upon Eichmann’s broken 
condition of thinking that could engender evil rather than a theory about evil per se. It was an 
unprecedented condition of thoughtlessness, linking our ability to think with morality itself. Yet, 
during the controversy many assumed she meant banal to be a new, universal theory about evil in 
the modern world. In one of the letters-to-the-editor for Musmanno’s original review in The New 
York Times, for example, one Joseph Kaskell wrote, “as shown by Miss Arendt, Eichmann was a 
prototype”119 of the modern perpetrator of evil. However, Arendt not only rejected the banality 
thesis as a general theory, but also rejected the notion of “general theories” themselves 
throughout her life. This resistance to generalization went well beyond a reluctance to find a 
universal notion of evil. She did not, unlike many sociologists of her day, believe historians 
should describe and implement universally applicable generalizations of historical or social 
phenomena. As Seyla Behabib puts it, “one of Arendt’s chief quarrels with the social sciences of 
her day was that the dominant positivist paradigm led to ahistorical modes of thinking and to 
hasty enthusiasm for analogies and generalizations… one searched for the generalizable and 
cross culturally ‘similar,’ more often than not ending in banal generalization.”120 In other words, 
Arendt was hesitant to derive a theory from the specific case of Eichmann that would be 
universally applicable to other, distinct historical events. For Arendt, it would be misleading to 
understand an event through a supposedly universal theory: positivistic law imposes its own 
meaning upon the event rather than deriving an independent judgment from the event itself.  	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Related to this misunderstanding surrounding the applicability of her banality thesis, 
Arendt’s “banality of evil” was often understood as an argument in support of “cog theory”—a 
theory, already circulating before Arendt’s 1963 publication of Eichmann in Jerusalem, that 
explained the potential for such massive crimes as a result of modern political or economic 
systems that use men like cogs in a bureaucratic, ideological machine. Arendt was not aligning 
herself with proponents of the “cog theory,” and in fact reiterates that this was the notion 
suggested by Eichmann’s defense during the trial. She outright rejected the idea that Eichmann 
was simply a robotic cog in a murderous bureaucratic machine in her 1963 book. “The whole 
cog theory is legally pointless,” Arendt explained. “All the cogs in the machinery, no matter how 
insignificant, are in court forthwith transformed back into perpetrators, that is to say, into human 
beings.”121 Arendt disliked the “cog theory” first and foremost because it was too large and 
abstract a scale with which to observe the case at hand: justice. Arendt’s “banality of evil” is 
interested less in describing and understanding the Nazi system than how this individual engaged 
with and behaved under that system.  
Despite Arendt’s many explicit refutations of this interpretation of her work, she was 
nonetheless understood as one of the champions of this cog theory. Because of this, a debate for 
or against “cog theory” often provided the framework through which her supporters and critics 
approached the problem of evil. In an editorial for The Reconstructionist – a journal “dedicated 
to the advancement of Judaism as a religious civilization, to the upbuilding of Eretz Yisrael as 
the spiritual center of the Jewish People, and to the furtherance of universal freedom, justice and 
peace”—the author attributed “strange and inexplicable bias” to the fact that “Miss 
Arendt…seems to have become convinced that Eichmann was simply a small cog in a great 
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machine. This is the very image of himself that Eichmann tried to project.”122 Interpreting Arendt 
as a proponent of “cog theory” was not relegated to her critics. Her supporters would also 
misunderstand her on this point. One of her supporters, political scientist Frederic Burin, for 
example, declared in 1964 “He [Eichmann] was but a cog.”123  
The “cog theory” was neither invented nor addressed by Arendt in her report. Before the 
publication of Eichmann in Jerusalem thinkers were already talking about this approach to 
Eichmann’s deed. Before the release of the verdict, American writer Harold Rosenberg, for 
example, explained the troubling way in which Eichmann’s deeds could be explained away as 
impersonal acts within a bureaucratic scheme—how are we to judge a cog if “a cog, cannot, of 
course, be concerned with suffering inflicted by the machine of which it is a part.”124 After 
Eichmann in Jerusalem was published, both Arendt’s supporters and critics continued to 
circulate this idea, this time in relation to Arendt’s work. Virtually everyone believed her work 
proposed a theory about the representative perpetrator of modern evil, one that simply obeys 
orders within his bureaucratic web. In the face of the lacuna of scholarship on the Holocaust at 
this point, a general theory about bureaucratic evil was both compelling—because it helped 
explain how the Nazi machine could carry out such an extensive horror—and horrifying—
because it could explain away and exonerate individual guilt in the crimes they took part in.  For 
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historian David Villa, the widespread misinterpretation of Arendt’s work “testifie[d] to a deeply 
rooted need for a picture of the ‘representative perpetrator’”125 in the aftermath of the Holocaust.   
Certainly the controversy revealed a need in the sense that both her critics and defenders 
desperately sought to understand larger questions of evil after the Holocaust, particularly because 
the Holocaust was left largely unexamined in a public arena. Yet, the controversy also most 
starkly reveals her critics’ anxiety about this particular interpretation of the Holocaust. In the first 
place, this understanding of Arendt was so vehemently rejected because it seemed to diminish 
Eichmann’s blame in the murder of the Jewish people. Because the “banality of evil” was 
perceived as a general theory about the distanced, obedient-rather-than-hateful perpetrator, 
Arendt was understood as disregarding the ways in which Eichmann was guilty and directly 
responsible for his crimes. Arendt critics largely agreed that Arendt had provided a justification 
of Eichmann’s only hope of defense at the trial. Thus, Lionel Abel argued that Arendt’s "picture 
of him [Eichmann] is the very one Eichmann himself presented in Jerusalem at his trial. Now 
obviously he could not have justified himself morally or politically; thus his only tactic was to 
present himself as not such a bad fellow after all, as a mere administrator with a high sense of 
duty, who had done what his superiors had told him to do in service to a regime whose objectives 
at the time he could not even suspect were evil."126 More importantly, however, placing 
Eichmann’s evil in the context of modernity rather than anti-Semitism led to the belief that she 
diminished the critical role Nazi’s Jew-hatred played in motivating the Final Solution. In reaction 
to Arendt’s portrait of Eichmann’s motives, Norman Podhoretz, for example, emphatically 
declared that “no person could have joined the Nazi party, let alone the S.S., who was not at the 
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very least a vicious anti-Semite."127 The central context in which Arendt sits her description of 
Eichmann’s motivations goes beyond anti-Semitism—a frame that, according to her critics, 
could obscure the specificity of Jewish victimhood. 
Arendt’s approach to ideological education and conviction under totalitarianism was 
deeply complex and nuanced, and she explored the subject to an extraordinary degree in Origins 
of Totalitarianism. Arendt understood the central roots of totalitarian movements neither in terms 
of fanatical ideology nor in terms of the modern man’s nature of conditioned obedience. We 
cannot simply stop at anti-Semitism as the explanatory motive for totalitarian genocide. Rather, 
we must understand the capacity for thinking and engaging under this ideology. As she put it in 
Origins of Totalitarianism, “The aim of totalitarian education has never been to instill 
convictions but to destroy the capacity to form any.”128 In Eichmann in Jerusalem, then, Arendt 
focused on Eichmann’s anti-Semitism less as the driving force, and more as the context in which 
it was enacted. As Arendt stated in Eichmann in Jerusalem that “only the choice of the victims, 
not the nature of the crime, could be derived from the long history of Jew-hatred and anti-
Semitism.”129 The origins of totalitarianism, so to speak, were not in anti-Semitism (which only 
target the victim), but in the rise of the modern, imperial nation-state, one that aimed to make 
men superfluous through stripping them the right of social and political humanity. In this sense, 
Arendt along with her mentor Jaspers would be a proponent of trying Eichmann for “crimes 
against humanity,” not “crimes against the Jews.” Framing the crime in such a way was crucial 
in our hopes of preventing such horror in the future. If only the choice of the victims were a 
result of anti-Semitism, then the Jews would not always be the only victims of genocide. Arendt 
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hoped to set a precedent for approaching this unprecedented crime, for “the unprecedented, once 
it has appeared, may become a precedent for the future, that all trials touching upon ‘crimes 
against humanity’ must be judged according to a standard that is today still an ‘ideal.’ If 
genocide is an actual possibility of the future, then no people on earth—least of all, of course, the 
Jewish People, in Israel or elsewhere—can feel reasonably sure of its continued existence 
without the help and the protection of international law.”130  
Bruno Bettelheim—Arendt supporter and prominent psychologist—thus stated that while 
the Israeli and Jewish community “viewed Hitlerism as a chapter, though the most lurid chapter, 
of anti-Semitism,” Arendt believed that “ this was not the last chapter in anti-Semitism but rather 
one of the first chapters in modern totalitarianism."131 This split exacerbated the tension in the 
controversy, and Arendt critics responded with a great deal of worry that Arendt’s frame would 
obscure the fact that this catastrophe was a willful, targeted and culturally specific intent to 
exterminate the Jews. Jacob Robinson, for example, was especially frustrated by what we might 
call the “secularity” or “universality” of her stance on the trial, also taking issue with the 
“substitution of ‘crimes against humanity’ for ‘crimes against the Jewish people’”—in his words, 
Arendt’s universality “would hardly do justice to the special place of the 'Jewish question' in the 
totality of Nazi doctrine and practice, and to the particular methods employed by the Nazis for 
dealing with Jews as compared with other racial, national, or political group.”132  
 For Arendt’s American Jewish critics, her reluctance to stress the centrality of anti-
Semitism in Eichmann’s motives failed to give proper weight to the particularity of Jewish 	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victimhood and experience in her account of the Holocaust. In response, Arendt’s critics not only 
disputed Arendt’s understanding of Eichmann, but also hoped to re-establish the importance of 
approaching the memory of Holocaust through specifically Jewish terms and voices. The strong 
emphasis on the importance and authority of Jewish historical frames and perspectives did not go 
unnoticed.  In Mary McCarthy’s 1964 Partisan Review article, The Hue and the Cry, Arendt’s 
longtime friend complained that her critics distorted and silenced the debate by arguing that only 
Jews could understand the Holocaust and thus the merits of Arendt’s arguments—“as a Gentile,” 
McCarthy writes bitterly, “I don’t ‘understand.’”133 Marie Syrkin, one of Arendt’s fiercest critics, 
responded by reaffirming that Jewish perspectives are not silencing the debate, but rather 
providing the most legitimate means to understand the Holocaust and honor its victims. The 
division between Arendt critics and supporters “would appear to be between the adequately 
informed, among whom Jews naturally predominate, and the uninformed, neither intellectually 
nor emotionally involved in the questions under debate."134  
Arendt critics in the controversy refashioned “their forefathers’ traditions and 
culture…and the sacredness of their memory”135 to stress their particular experience and 
understanding of the Holocaust. American Jewish critics sought to recover Jewish history and 
culture not only as a means to honor and respect the victims of the Holocaust, but also as a way 
to frame an understanding of the importance of this debate. For them it was a distinctly Jewish 
experience—by placing the history of the Holocaust outside of decades anti-Semitism and 
Jewish victimhood, Arendt was threatening Jewish power to tell their own narrative of the death 
of six million Jews. As Laurence Thomas, political scientist of Jewish and Black experiences, 	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puts it in 1988, the Jews were fighting for “group autonomy” after the Holocaust, defined by 
Thomas as “when by and large it is regarded by other groups as the foremost interpreter of its 
own history and experiences.”136 As Jewish thinkers fought for the proliferation of Holocaust 
memory on Jewish terms, American Jews refashioned an understanding of Jewish history and 
identity through which to approach this memory. In doing so, American Jews publicly re-
examine their understanding of both the Holocaust and their own Jewish identity.  
 
The Sacred Memory of the Victim  
Arendt’s critics not only accused Arendt of obscuring the specificity of Jewish 
victimhood, for they also accused her of tarnishing the memory of those victims. With her 
infamous comments on Jewish council leaders complicity with their Nazi perpetrators, Arendt 
had violated the sacredness of victim memory. If with her banality thesis she challenged the 
mythic proportions of evil, with her comments on Jewish behavior she also challenged the 
mythic proportions of good. In seemingly both obscuring and defaming the memory of Jewish 
victims of the Holocaust, Arendt violated the inviolable: the respect, honor and sacredness of the 
memory of the victims. This, perhaps, was the deepest emotional offense Arendt committed in 
the eyes of her critics.  
Arendt was not the first person to bring up the notion of complicity during the Holocaust. 
Raul Hilberg’s The Destruction of the European Jews (1961) was one of the first attempts to 
comprehensibly analyze the Holocaust, and it “attracted a good deal of attention because it came 
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out in the middle of the Eichmann trial.”137 As H.R. Trevor-Roper explains in his Commentary 
review of the text, “we cannot escape the fact that the Jews of Europe, obedient to their leaders 
and their own habits of mind, collaborated in their own destruction. Again and again this fact 
emerges from Mr. Hilberg's narrative. It is his most surprising revelation, and it will probably be 
the least welcome to his readers. But it is inescapable.”138 This finding, of course, did not go 
unchallenged, but nor did it erupt in a controversy like Arendt’s. Letters in response to Trevor-
Roper’s review noted that Hilberg’s  “generalizations . . . are untrue and are based on selected 
evidence, on half-truths,” rejecting Hilberg’s thesis. In fact, the Jewish community, in America 
and in Israel, was no stranger to the charge of Jewish collaboration, and had debated the issue 
since the war ended. It should be noted that the “first time an Israeli court had to confront the 
Holocaust, it was a Jewish leader who was put on trial”139—the Trial of Rudolf Kastner, a 
prominent Jewish leader accused of having collaborated with the Nazis in an effort to save 
roughly 1500 Hungarian Jews from certain death.  As historian Leora Bilsky has pointed out, 
after his prosecution (wherein an Israeli judge told Kastner he had sold his soul to the devil), 
murder and posthumous pardon, “in the early 1960s, Israeli society was just recovering from the 
painful stage of accusing the victims for their own disaster and moving on to blame the 
victimizers.”140  
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It is not hard, however, to see why Arendt’s comments in Eichmann in Jerusalem would 
have been particularly controversial. In one of the most debated sections of the report, Arendt 
wrote:  
To a Jew this role of the Jewish leaders in the destruction of their own people is 
undoubtedly the darkest chapter of the whole dark story. It had been known about before, 
but it has now been exposed for the first time in all its pathetic and sordid detail by Raul 
Hilberg...the whole truth was that there existed Jewish community organizations and 
Jewish party and welfare organizations on both the local and the international level. 
Wherever Jews lived, there were recognized Jewish leaders, and this leadership, almost 
without exception, cooperated in one way or another, for one reason or another, with the 
Nazis. The whole truth was that if the Jewish people had really been unorganized and 
leaderless, there would have been chaos and plenty of misery but the total number of 
victims would hardly have been between four and a half and six million people.”141  
Here, Arendt is not addressing the behavior of the majority of Jews during the Holocaust, but is 
explicitly addressing the role of Jewish leaders. Arendt tries to be careful to distinguish between 
the conditions of terror for a majority of the Jews and for the Jewish leaders. In a letter to Mary 
McCarthy, Arendt explains that “the point of the matter is that the absolute terror of which I 
spoke in the Origins of Totalitarianism, was present for the Jews in the camps, and, generally 
speaking, for the Jewish people. But this was by no means true for the ‘leaders.’”142 Furthermore, 
it is not that Arendt critiques the Jewish leaders failure to resist the Nazis, for Arendt believes 
that “Resistance was well-nigh impossible also outside the camps though people did not act 
under the immediate impact of terror.” Arendt points out not that the leaders should have 
resisted, but that they should have not participated at all. As Arendt asserts, “what was possible 
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there, the Jewish Councils, was non-participation. So the alternative is never: Resistance and 
rebellion, as Hausner indicated, but in the case of the Jewish Elders: non-participation.”143  
 In her report, Arendt was particularly controversial not only because she challenged the 
sacredness of victimhood, but also because she identified specific leaders that were dear to the 
Jewish community.  In particular Arendt shares a whole host of harsh words about Dr. Leo 
Baeck, a rabbi and Jewish leader who would come to be on the Jewish Council at the 
concentration camp Theresienstadt. In the original version of her series Arendt claimed some had 
called him the “Jewish Fuhrer”—although she would later remove this term—for his 
involvement in gathering the lists of those to be deported for death to Auschwitz. For Arendt, 
Baeck was a “voluntary ‘bearer of secrets’” for the Nazis, helping them with their work while 
aware of the imminent death of the people he listed for deportation. Although some called this 
silence a more ‘humane’ solution in the face of the inevitable, Arendt states that “during the 
Eichmann trial, one witness pointed out the unfortunate consequences of this kind of 
‘humanity’—people volunteered for deportation from Theresienstadt to Auschwitz and 
denounced those who tried to tell them the truth as being ‘not sane.’”144 She had, in short, dwelt 
on Jewish complicity in such a way that seemed to insult the honor of Jewish victims. Her critic 
Norman Podhoretz captured this violation perfectly: “In the place of the monstrous Nazi, she 
gives us the 'banal' Nazi; in the place of the Jew as a virtuous martyr, she gives us the Jew as 
accomplice in evil; and in the place of the confrontation of guilt and innocence, she gives the 
'collaboration' of criminal and victims.’”145 
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Arendt, in Eichmann in Jerusalem and earlier in Origins of Totalitarianism, had also 
commented on the “well-known” fact that “the distinction between victim and persecutors was 
blurred in the concentration camps, deliberately and with calculations.”146 Arendt challenged the 
conventional understanding of the victim of evil in approaching her analysis of totalitarian 
methods. For Arendt, this chapter of the story “offers the most striking insight into the totality of 
the moral collapse the Nazis caused in respectable European society—not only in Germany but 
in almost all countries, not only among the persecutors but also among the victims.”147 Yet, 
Arendt was also adamant that “this is not what I mean by a Jewish share in the guilt…this was 
part of the system and had indeed nothing to do with the Jews.”148 She deconstructs the 
distinction between victim and perpetrator not to place blame on the victim, but rather to express 
the insidious, repugnant ways in which Nazi totalitarianism prompted their victims to aid in their 
own destruction under conditions of terror.  
 The very premise of Arendt’s approach to understanding Jewish behavior in Eichmann in 
Jerusalem was often rejected outright by her critics. In response to Arendt’s idea that humans 
were “compelled to participate in their own extermination,” Gershom Scholem responds with 
outcry—“is the distinction between torturer and victim thereby blurred? What perversity!”149 
Arendt critics would resist any attempt to mar the sanctity of Jewish victims. Syrkin would of 
course agree with Scholem, arguing that it is “precisely the ‘evil’ of the victim that is at issue—
whether in descending or ascending order of responsibility.”150 Yet, more broadly, Arendt’s 
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victims together, portraying Arendt’s book as an attempt to comprehensively place blame on the 
Jews for the murder of their own people. As Marie Syrkin argued, “her [Arendt’s] accusation of 
the Jews, far from being ironic or even subtle, is explicit and unequivocal, and is not at all 
limited to "Jewish functionaries."151 All of her most prominent critics echoed Syrkin on this 
point and agreed that Arendt was judging the Jews for their own destruction, tarnishing victim’s 
memory with the charge of complicity. Norman Podhoretz went further to argue that Arendt’s 
critique of the leadership’s actions is implicitly a critique of the Jew himself. “She is saying that 
if the Jews had not been Jews, the Nazis would not have been able to kill so many of them—
which is a difficult proposition to dispute,” Podhoretz insisted. “I do not think I am being unfair 
to Miss Arendt here. Consider: the Jews of Europe, even where they were 'highly assimilated,' 
were an organized people, and in most cases a centrally organized people."152  
 Hence, in response to Arendt’s book, Judge Michael Musmanno wrote an article in the 
National Jewish Monthly entitled “Did the 6,000,000 kill themselves?” arguing forcefully against 
what her critics believed to be her point: that the Jews were responsible for their own deaths. As 
he put it, Hannah Arendt had given “enthusiastic currency to Eichmann’s mad claim that the 
Jews operated in their own destruction.”153 Central to this interpretation was an understanding 
that Arendt was not only charging complicity, but also blame for Jewish failure to resist. Elie 
Wiesel, for example, complained of a “kind of intellectual fad” to ask the Jews ““Why did they 
go off to the slaughter like sheep? Why didn’t they revolt?”154 Wiesel explicitly named Arendt 
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and Bruno Bettelheim as part of this “intellectual fad,” but the truth is Arendt herself called those 
questions “cruel and silly,”155 condemning the prosecution for asking survivors those questions 
during the Eichmann Trial. Arendt was adamant that she was not making the victims responsible 
for their slaughter “by their failure to resist…Still, this accusation even found its way into the 
Encyclopedia Judaica,"156 becoming the predominant interpretation of Arendt’s discussion of 
Jewish behavior during the Holocaust.  
 Part of Arendt’s violation of the sanctity of Jewish victimhood was her refusal to grant 
the honor of martyrdom to Jewish victims.  In a July 1963 lecture at Columbia University, 
Arendt tells her Jewish students that it is a lie to say “our dead were martyrs—but martyrs are 
only people who are given a choice. It was precisely martyrdom which the Nazi system had 
made impossible. Our dead were simply ‘innocents.’”157 Certainly this approach provoked much 
misunderstanding and resentment for her apparent refusal to honor and respect the dead. 
Amongst other critics, the rabbi of Hillcrest Jewish Center in New York stated in April 1963 that 
Arendt “almost reverses the roles and makes the victims guilty of the crime. Why can we not let 
the martyred dead at least rest in peace?”158 And yet, Arendt was not attempting to diminish the 
truth of the pain and suffering that this “thought-defying” evil could cause, nor was she trying to 
place all blame on the dead (indeed she called them innocent). Rather, in a sense, Arendt was 
critiquing the use of legend to approach history. She not only rejects the specific claim to 
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thinking about the Holocaust in terms of an almost mythical division between the devil and the 
sacred sacrifice of victims, but she also rejects legend as an interpretive vehicle itself. As she 
explained to her Jewish Students at Columbia in July 1963, “the alternative to this thinking and 
judging are legends: Their enormous importance in history, almost greater than historical events. 
I don’t say or think that legends are necessarily bad, but in our instance they hide the truth, more: 
they are lies, that is, they don’t explain reality but in legendary form argue it away.”159 
Furthermore, this debate reveals a deeper split in the manner in which Arendt and her 
critics drew meaning from a history of unspeakable horror. Both sides reflected a mood of loss—
as Arendt explained, after Auschwitz “it was as if an abyss had opened.” Yet, they would 
approach this abyss of understanding quite differently. While her critics looked to the traditions 
and continuities in the history of the Jews in order to both preserve their memory and refashion 
and remold their meaning for a post-Holocaust world, Arendt proposed that historians should 
focus on ruptures of historical narratives, learning from the past in order to form new 
foundations for our thinking. She denied continuity and progressions that imply inevitabilities, 
and borrowed Walter Benjamin’s idea to “to break the chain of narrative continuity, to shatter 
chronology as the natural structure of narrative, to stress fragmentariness, historical dead ends, 
failures, and ruptures…it is also a way of ‘preserving the past’ without being enslaved by it, in 
particular without having one’s moral and political imagination stifled by arguments of 
‘historical necessity.’”160 Arendt, in sum, was arguing for a disruption of our relationship to the 
past, understanding our world not through the frameworks of past traditions but rather learning 
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how to build new frameworks from the lessons of the past. “It seemed to me,” Arendt said in 
1964, that “there should be a basis for a communication precisely in the abyss of Auschwitz.”161
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Chapter 2 
Negotiating Identity Through Memory 
 
In the aftermath of Nazi horror, Theodor Adorno famously wrote that “to write poetry 
after Auschwitz is barbaric.”1 Although he later doubted the applicability of his own words, the 
mood of the post-Holocaust is well captured by his statement: it was a mood of loss, both of lives 
and pillars of thinking and approaches to the world. Many came to describe the crimes 
perpetrated upon the European Jews as indescribable, for the extremity of Nazi deeds seemed to 
surpass our ability to represent them. How does one express unspeakable horror? The Holocaust, 
in so grossly violating human understanding and imagination, presented the world with a 
problem of history. For many, this new, “unspeakable” horror rendered the prevailing 
approaches to the past limited, insufficient, even reductive. Yet, the need to share the reality of 
this horror was acutely felt. This history needed to be told, both to honor the dignity of its 
victims and to impart the lessons gleaned from their deaths. Attempts at representing the 
Holocaust were dangerous because there was a need for truth, but our collective ability to 
express those truths was (and still is) limited. Writing histories of the Holocaust has remained a 
daunting task since the fall of Nazi power. Historian Raul Hilberg wrote, even in the 1980s, that 
“the recreators of the Holocaust, be they historians, sculptors, architects, designers, 
novelists…are molding something new,” yet they take a risk “if they take poetic license to 
subtract something from the crude reality for the sake of heightened effect.”2 
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 In his 1951 essay Adorno signaled a problem that the players in the Arendt controversy 
would confront, for the stakes involved in writing the history of the Holocaust were not just a 
matter of content. While almost everyone agreed that Holocaust history must be recorded, there 
remained, and indeed still remains, the problem of how to describe what happened. Beyond the 
problem of inexpressibility in the aftermath of trauma, there was also the problem of how to use 
these histories to understand, and most importantly, prevent, such horrors. One needed to 
preserve the memory of the victims through history, but, in doing so, one could also preserve the 
logic of their murderers. As Hannah Arendt told us about the difficulties she encountered while 
writing Origins of Totalitarianism, “my first problem was how to write historically about 
something—totalitarianism—which I did not want to conserve but on the contrary felt engaged 
to destroy.”3 
 The controversy that ensued after the 1963 publication of Arendt’s Eichmann in 
Jerusalem was partly a result of these difficulties of historical pursuits. Because Arendt had 
seemingly violated the terms and methods through which one should talk about the Holocaust, 
the debate about Arendt’s report provided an opportunity for her critics to negotiate and 
construct practices of memory. As Arendt critic Walter Laqueur so astutely pointed out in 1965, 
“Miss Arendt was attacked not so much for what she said, but for how she said it."4 The 
controversy was precisely a struggle to define the ways one should approach the scene of this 
tragedy. 
 Over the course of the controversy, Arendt and her critics disputed each other’s 
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delineate and establish new standards of historical discourse. Those involved in the debate, 
particularly Arendt, did more than just negotiate standards of Holocaust histories. They identified 
and tested the limits of those standards. If Adorno declared that poetry after the Holocaust is an 
insult to the dead, Arendt and this controversy challenged Adorno’s approach. In one example, a 
Jewish Columbia student named Don Levine wrote to Arendt in 1963, telling her “I had the 
pleasure of hearing your talk at the university…you had remarked during the talk something to 
the effect that ‘the poets would have to get at this material.’ I have often felt this way myself.”5  
Levine then used Arendt’s lecture as an opportunity to make “an attempt” at describing the 
Holocaust through poetry: “I have distorted some of the facts and juggled history in favor of 
great concision and poetic effect…I am sending [my poem] to you partly out of egoistic reasons, 
but I would like to believe that I am also doing it to show you that not all of us in America have 
forgotten, that I have not forgotten, that there is a debt that I feel (to history if you like, or to 
man) which I am trying to cope with in the only terms I feel I can—poetry.”6 One can imagine 
how Adorno, or even Raul Hilberg after him, might have been skeptical of the “distorted facts” 
and “juggled history” presented by this student, but Hannah Arendt welcomed, even encouraged, 
this type of pursuit. Arendt wrote back to Don Levine on January 13, 1964, telling him, “I was 
very moved by your poems…I think I know that it is precisely the poets who have not forgotten, 
no matter who or where they are. Must I send them back to you? I would very much like to keep 
them.”7  
 Arendt, by virtue of publicly challenging modes of discourse, invited others to do the 
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into exploring the Holocaust. One Thomas McAfee, for example, also sent her a poem that he 
wrote, entitling the work “Eichmann In Jerusalem—After Reading Hannah Arendt.”8 In his 
poem, McAfee echoed some of the specific ways in which Arendt’s book would provoke 
questions of discourse:  
More in quarry, barred on top, 
than in quandary, 
as to where to presuppose, 
we question, What 
shall we, where shall we, 
what shall we do 
with this Jew Eichmann? 
 
For we must presuppose ourselves. 
Die at our own hands. 
(Stupidity can be 
lyrical. But there’s no lyric 
in this solemn German whisper.) 
We can set the monster 
by a standard 
How can we set 
the less than ordinary head?9 
 
McAfee, beyond venturing to use poetry, struggles to understand the “standard” by which we can 
judge Eichmann. Here, poetic expression is precisely how McAfee seeks to grasp a problem that 
lacks a guiding “standard.” Furthermore, McAfee calls Eichmann “a Jew,” a confusing, perhaps 
ironic suggestion that, in any case, would have been insulting to any Jewish reader at the time. 
Whether Arendt would have balked at this usage or not, the message is clear: Arendt herself 
became a tool through which one could present their own challenges to the limits and taboos of 
Holocaust history.  
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In challenging the way we can talk about the Holocaust, Arendt was also engaged in a 
conversation about how to approach this memory as a Jew. Indeed Arendt was Jewish herself, 
and in this sense provoked a discussion about how one’s identity as a Jew informs and is 
informed by the memory of the destruction of six million Jews. If Arendt disrupted historical 
approaches, Arendt also disrupted understandings of a Jewish identity and how this identity 
dictated certain social expectations in America. Most centrally, Arendt had violated the 
expectations attached to this identity because she seemed to not only reject her own Jewishness, 
but also to have accepted the anti-Semite’s belief in Jewish inferiority. In ceasing to speak from 
and for the Jewish people, Arendt’s report pushed against the limits of acceptable behavior for a 
Jew in the post-Holocaust world. Yet, because she was so disruptive, her report also became a 
figure against which particular expectations attached to Jewish discourse were further delineated 
and solidified. It could be said that identity and its embedded social practices were built up over 
the course of the controversy—not because memory directly constructed their identity but 
because this memory provided an ongoing site of negotiation about how to historicize the 
Holocaust as a Jew.  
 In order to explore the relationship between Holocaust memory and the identity of 
American Jews, this chapter will first discuss how Arendt’s ironic and detached tone provoked 
outcry because it seemed to eschew identification with the Jewish people and their suffering. 
Although Arendt’s critics took issue with her refusal to speak from and for the perspective of the 
Jews, Arendt’s approach explicitly advocated for a voice detached from any one identity. 
Through her understanding of storytelling, Arendt suggested that the historian must engage and 
present a multiplicity of perspectives. Section 2 of this chapter will discuss how Arendt’s critics 
not only feared that she wished to reject her Jewish identity, but also understood her report to be 
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a signal of Arendt’s self-hatred as a Jew. By marking Arendt as a self-hating Jew, Arendt’s 
critics refashioned Arendt’s report both as a test of one’s Jewish allegiances and as a way to 
articulate the dangers of assimilation in an anti-Semitic world. Moreover, Arendt would become 
a figure that embodied the virtual “limit” of being Jewish—self-hatred marked the edge of 
acceptable Jewish self-criticism, for the point at which one’s Jewishness flipped back to destroy 
itself was also the point at which one no longer should be considered to be speaking from a 
legitimate Jewish perspective. Finally, section 3 will discuss how Arendt did not wish to reject 
her own Jewishness, but rather advocated for a shifted notion of what being Jewish entailed: an 
embrace of Jewish “pariahdom,” a self-conscious practice of engaging and promoting the 
perspectives of alterity and difference.  
 
The Author and Her Story  
Throughout Eichmann in Jerusalem, Arendt enraged her critics by exploring Eichmann’s 
role in the Holocaust with a heavy-handed use of impersonal irony. As Arendt herself put it in 
1964, “that the tone [of Eichmann in Jerusalem] is predominantly ironic is true.”10 In describing 
Eichmann’s perspective on the “Jewish Question,” for example, Arendt explains that after 
reading the “famous Zionist classic” Theodor Herzl’s Der Judenstaat, Eichmann was converted 
“promptly and forever to Zionism…From then on, as he repeated over and over, he thought of 
hardly anything but a ‘political solution.’”11 Arendt clearly did not believe Eichmann was a 
Zionist nor did she think that he understood its full meaning. Rather, she included Eichmann’s 
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ironic self-understanding to present Eichmann’s point of view. According to Arendt, Eichmann 
felt like a Zionist because he literally wanted to move Jews out of Germany to solve the “Jewish 
Question” before the “Final Solution” became the only solution. Mistaking Arendt’s retelling of 
Eichmann’s ironic self-conception as her own conception of Eichmann, many American Jews 
found the suggestion of Eichmann’s Zionism to be insensitive, perhaps deliberately so. The Anti-
Defamation League, for example, published a report in the July-August 1963 issue of their 
journal Facts wherein the author argued Arendt’s suggestion that Eichmann was a “Zionist” was 
“somewhat like referring to Poles or Russians who engaged in pogroms, shouting ‘Jews to 
Palestine!’, as ‘Zionists.’…the main function of much of his adult life was to destroy the Jewish 
people. The word ‘Zionist’ is, at best, misused by Dr. Arendt.”12  Her defenders would maintain 
that her critics were “blind to her gift of irony,”13 but whether they saw through the irony or not, 
the use of irony itself seemed to be the problem.  
Arendt’s critics primarily took issue with what the use of irony implied about Arendt’s 
relationship to her fellow Jews: Arendt’s distanced, cold, and dispassionate rhetoric 
demonstrated that she remained unmoved by Jewish suffering, unallied with their position in the 
world. Retelling the perspective of Eichmann, the judges at his trial and sometimes Eichmann’s 
Jewish victims, Arendt did not primarily narrate the story from the perspective of a Jew, but 
rather maintained a distanced voice throughout her report. As Walter Laquer pointed out in 1983, 
“Hannah Arendt’s reproaches were those of an outsider, lacking identification: they were almost 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Jacob Robinson, “A Report on the Evil of Banality: The Arendt Book,” Facts—Published by 
the Anti-Defamation League, July-August, 1963, vol. 15, no. 1. The Hannah Arendt Papers 
Library of Congress.  
13 Peter Davison, letter to the editor, New York Times. June 23, 1963, sec. The New York Times 
Book Review.  
 71 
inhumanly cold.”14 Her “cold” or distanced approach was interpreted first and foremost as a 
disregard for the enormity of horror experienced by the Jews. For her critics, the emotional and 
horrifying nature of the subject demanded a personal and emotional response, and Arendt’s 
refusal to do so seemed to reveal a dismissal of her own people. The Director of Publications for 
the Anti-Defamation League, Henry Schwarzschild, warned Arendt of the storm that awaited her 
in America while she was abroad in March 1963, telling her that her tone would become a source 
of controversy. He tells her, “your tone in relating Eichmann’s own career is so studiedly normal, 
so Kafkaesquely normal… Perhaps it is a mistake to stick with the technical terminology—final 
solution, transport, liquidation, etc.”15 
 A detached, unemotional approach was simply not appropriate for the subject at hand 
according to her critics, and her failure to exhibit her own emotional involvement in the topic 
revealed her lack of allegiance to the Jewish people. As Albert Hoschander Friedlander pointed 
out in the Central Conference American Rabbis Journal in October 1963, “the very nature of 
Miss Arendt’s material requires the involvement of passion.”16 For Friedlander and many others, 
Arendt was “the prototype of the intellectual,” for whom “the agonizing moral decisions of 
European community leaders who stand in the midst of a human situation become a cold 
intellectual problem that hindsight solves brilliantly.”17 In response to Arendt, her critics 
demanded that she personally engage the subject as a Jew, for the truth of this history was 
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inextricably tied to its emotional and personal nature. Thus Friedlander wrote that Arendt 
provides “an overly objective approach to a problem that required more subjectivity.”18  
 One of Arendt’s supporters, Daniel Bell, echoed this reading in fall 1963, explaining that 
Arendt’s report was controversial precisely because Arendt refused to write from and for the 
particularity of the Jewish identity. As he put it,  
It is this tension between the parochial and the universal that explains the furious 
emotions over Miss Arendt’s book. For she writes from the standpoint of a universal 
principle which denies any parochial identity. It is this which gives her exposition a cold 
force and an abstract quality… the Jews remain a people, and the experiences of the race 
are the shaping elements of one’s identity. One feels that while many of Miss Arendt’s 
strictures are correct—if one can live by a universalistic standard—her response to the 
unbearable story reduces a tragic drama to a philosophical complexity. Can one exclude 
the existential person as a component of the human judgment? In this situation, one’s 
identity as a Jew, as well as philosophe, is relevant. The agony of Miss Arendt’s book is 
precisely that she takes her stand so unyieldingly on the side of disinterested justice, and 
that she judges both Nazi and Jew. But abstract justice, as the Talmudic wisdom knew, is 
sometimes too ‘strong’ a yardstick to judge the world.19  
Bell, along with Arendt’s critics, believed Arendt was attempting to create a single universal 
standard with which to judge the past, explicitly eschewing and betraying a particularly Jewish 
voice and perspective. As Bell put it, Arendt “has cut all such ties [of parochial identity]: There 
is the unmoved quality of the Stoic, transcending tribe and nation.”20 
For Arendt, adopting her tone was not simply a matter of rhetorical strategy. It was the 
necessary path to understanding this past. As she reminded her students at the University of 
Chicago in October 1963, “the extent of the catastrophe, the moral catastrophe, we can only now 
slowly realize. We shall have to come to terms with it, but not by sentimentality and evading the 
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issues.”21 Although Arendt certainly believed that the “role of the ‘heart in politics…[is] 
altogether questionable” because it often “conceals factual truth,”22 she most centrally took issue 
with the way in which social and pre-political facts like one’s Jewishness inform and even 
prescribe one’s public engagement and understanding of history. Said in another way, Arendt did 
not believe one’s identity should define their understanding of the world by providing the 
standards through which one will judge an issue. Arendt eschewed all pre-established standards 
through which to judge the past, accepting neither standards derived from one’s identity nor 
standards derived from supposedly “universal” experiences. Rather, Arendt hoped human 
judgment would be understood as “not bound by standards and rules under which particular 
cases are subsumed, but on the contrary, [as that which] produces its own principles by virtue of 
the judging activity itself: only under this assumption can we risk ourselves on this very slippery 
moral ground with some hope of finding some firm footing.”23 It was not a choice between a 
universal or particular standard for Arendt, it was a question of a “standard” itself. 
Bell wrote that Arendt judged from “the standpoint of a universal principle,” but Arendt 
was distinctly rejecting any principle through which to judge the past, whether it be universal or 
specific to the Jews. Arendt’s voice seemed detached not because of a reliance upon a “universal 
standard” or a refusal to identify with the Jews, but rather because she insisted on “thinking 
without banisters,” precisely an attempt to think without pre-established standards. During the 
1972 Arendt conference covered by Recovery of the Public World (1979), Arendt described 
“thinking without banisters” through a physical metaphor of walking down stairs, explaining, “as 
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23 Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem, 27.  
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you go up and down the stairs you can always hold onto the bannister so that you don’t fall 
down. But we have lost this bannister. That is the way I tell it to myself. And this is indeed what 
I try to do.”24 For Arendt, thinking “without banisters” destabilized the terms that guide our 
understanding of the world. It was thinking freed from reliance upon a singular standard that 
could falsely impose meaning rather than reveal truths. Arendt was aware that this approach was 
unsettling. As she put it in a 1972 Conference about her own political thought, “if you come up 
with such a thing and you take away their bannisters from people—their safe guiding lines (and 
then they talk about the breakdown of tradition but they have never realized what it means! That 
it means you really are out in the cold!) then, of course, the reaction is—and this has been my 
case quite often—that you are simply ignored. And I don’t mind that. Sometimes you are 
attacked. But you usually are ignored, because even useful polemic cannot be carried through on 
my terms.”25 
In order to “think without banisters” and escape a blinding reliance upon a singular point 
of view, Arendt suggested that the historian should represent, retell and engage multiple 
perspectives. Arendt hoped projects of history could undergo “storytelling,” wherein the 
storyteller would narrate “the story of an event or situation from the plurality of perspectives that 
constitute it as a public phenomenon."26 As political theorist Seyla Benhabib has argued,  “At 
stake in such representational narrative was the ability ‘to take the standpoint of the other,’ which 
did not mean empathizing or even sympathizing with the other but re-creating the world as it 
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appears through the eyes of others.”27 Considering and representing other points of view is 
crucial in the quest to understand the world, for, as Arendt put it in Promise of Politics, “no one 
can adequately grasp the objective world in its full reality all on his own.”28 
For Arendt, it would be a mistake for the historian to impose a singular point of view. 
Thus, storytelling “reveals meaning without committing the error of defining it”29 because it asks 
one to consider the multiple points of view on the same issue. A detached voice is precisely what 
Arendt hoped to achieve in Eichmann in Jerusalem, not in order to betray her Jewish identity or 
deny Jewish perspectives, but rather to encourage others to consider perspectives in addition to 
the Jewish ones. Thus, in Arendt’s explicit refusal to comprehensively speak from and for the 
Jews, her critics mistook her need to understand a plurality of perspectives as a denial of her own 
Jewish identity, allegiance and sympathies.  
 
Self-Hatred and Self-Making 
 Arendt’s refusal to speak from and for the Jewish perspective seemed a refusal to belong 
to the Jews. Arendt’s report was itself controversial, but the fact that the report was written by a 
Jewish author made it all the more polemical. The extent to which Arendt’s critics questioned 
Arendt’s identity and personal motivations reveals that the controversy was not simply about 
how anyone could talk about the Holocaust, but about how Jews could talk about the Holocaust. 
By debating how Jews should speak about the Holocaust, Arendt’s critics revealed and rebuilt 
the expectations of discourse attached to one’s Jewish identity. 	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For Arendt’s critics, one’s Jewishness, as with other forms of identity, carried with it of 
course religious customs, but also expectations for what you could and could not say. As 
philosopher and feminist thinker Judith Butler has argued, “religion functions as a matrix of 
subject formation, an embedded framework for valuations, and a mode of belonging and 
embodied social practice.”30Arendt’s critics took issue with Arendt’s failure to identify with and 
show love for the Jewish people in her discussion of the Holocaust. Her critics’ loud 
condemnation of Arendt’s betrayal of allegiance reveals Arendt had violated what had come to 
be expected of a Jewish perspective. Arendt’s violation of her critics’ expectations of public 
loyalty and support are nowhere better seen than in her famous correspondence with Gershom 
Scholem in Encounter. On June 12, 1963, Scholem wrote:  
It is that heartless, frequently almost sneering and malicious tone with which these 
matters, touching the very quick of our life, are treated in your book to which I take 
exception…In the Jewish tradition there is a concept, hard to define and yet concrete 
enough, which we know as Ahabath Israel: "Love of the Jewish People...' In you, dear 
Hannah, as in so many intellectuals who came from the German Left, I find little trace of 
this…To speak of all this, however, in so wholly inappropriate a tone… this is not the 
way to approach the scene of that tragedy.31  
In her reply, Arendt would provide an incredible insight into her approach to thinking in a world 
with so many allegiances and duties towards their people. She wrote to Scholem:   
You are quite right— I am not moved by any 'love' of this sort, and for two reasons: I 
have never in my life 'loved' any people or collective— neither the German people, nor 
the French, nor the American, nor the working class or anything of that sort. I indeed love 
'only' my friends and the only kind of love I know of and believe in is the love of persons. 
Secondly, this 'love of the Jews' would appear to me, since I am myself Jewish, as 
something rather suspect. I cannot love myself or anything which I know is part and 
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parcel of my own person... I do not 'love' the Jews, nor do I 'believe' in them; I merely 
belong to them as a matter of course, beyond dispute or arguments.32  
Arendt not only takes issue with the involvement of the “heart” in politics, but she also reveals 
that her identity should be treated as a fact “beyond dispute or arguments” rather than a guiding 
principle of her public engagement. Arendt, then, challenged this expectation of public “Love for 
the Jewish People,” taking issue primarily with allowing one’s identity to prescribe thinking in 
the public realm. As Arendt told Scholem, “what confuses you is that my arguments and my 
approach are different from what you are used to; in other words, the trouble is that I am 
independent. By this I mean, on the one hand, that I do not belong to any organization and 
always speak only for myself."33 By seemingly violating the expectations of public love and 
support for the Jewish people, Arendt’s report created a demand for such loyalty in the minds of 
her critics. Arendt’s violation, in other words, encouraged the solidification of the standard of 
allegiance she so harshly refused.   
In addition to Arendt’s violations of speaking from and for the Jewish people, Arendt was 
also grossly challenging the assumed limits of Jewish self-criticism. She seemed to have crossed 
the line of acceptable Jewish critique of the Jewish people.34 After the Holocaust there was, 
unsurprisingly, anxiety about the dangers of Jews criticizing Jews. As Jewish writer Elliot Cohen 
remarked in his 1949 Commentary piece, the “leadership of the Jewish ‘community’ urged 
‘restraint’ on the ‘free and lively exchange of ideas’ for fear that the ‘goyim hear and use it 
against us.’”35 Even so, Cohen and other American Jewish intellectuals defended the right to 
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engage in “‘decent’ Jewish ‘self-criticism’”36 throughout the 50s and 60s. Historian Howard 
Sachar echoed Cohen’s earlier frustration with the anxiety about self-criticism found in the 
Jewish community when he spoke before the American Jewish Historical Society in 1966, for 
example. He challenged American Jewry to “take a step further in our evaluation of ourselves 
and or past, to liberate ourselves from the myth that a critical and analytical appraisal of Jewish 
life and Jewish history is somehow ‘washing our dirty linen’ in public?...I sometimes believe that 
not the least of wounds the Hitler epoch—anti-Semitism—inflicted upon us was the excuse it has 
given us for avoiding legitimate (as distinguished from pathological) self-criticism.”37 This was 
not an uncommon frustration for many in the Jewish community, with one Jewish man, Gershon 
Weiler, writing to Arendt on July 1, 1963, “washing dirty linen in public is not a Jewish 
failing.”38 Many American Jewish intellectuals, speaking before and during the Arendt 
controversy, defended the right of “decent” self-criticism, but it is this “decent” clause that 
Arendt seemed to have violated. 
 More specifically, Arendt’s critics believed that her critiques of Jewish behavior were 
derived not from independent self-reflection but from an internalization of an anti-Semitic 
viewpoint. The danger in Arendt’s Jewish criticism was not simply that it could inflame anti-
Semitic fervor, but also that the hostile world was convincing Jews to believe in their own 
inferiority. The worst of the world’s endless hostility was not simply in its ability to provoke 
Gentile violence against the Jews, but in its ability to prompt Jews to be hostile to themselves. 
Arendt’s critics argued precisely that Arendt had internalized the viewpoint of the other, of the 
goyim who throughout history has remained anti-Semitic. Arendt’s work “can only be 	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understood as a sad result of diaspora,” for this “Jewess tries to interpret the tragedy of our 
people in such a one-sided way,” Michaelis-Stern states in her negative review in Das Neue 
Isreal.39 Here, because Arendt is in “diaspora” and therefore surrounded by non-Jews, Arendt is 
being accused of internalizing or adopting the perspective of the hostile, Gentile world, the world 
that would judge the Jews in “such a one-sided way.” In other words, Michaelis-Stern attributes 
Arendt’s “one-sided” prejudice to her supposed adoption of the anti-Semite’s worldview.  
 What many were, in essence, accusing Arendt of was Jewish self-hatred, a concept that 
certainly existed before the War, but that had gained much popularity after. The concept of self-
hatred was not one that was foreign to Jewish history and identity in America. According to 
historian Susan Glenn, the 1940s and 1950s in America saw the term widely used as a way to 
define the “neurosis” of the wartime generation.40 For Glenn, the “vogue of ‘Jewish self-hatred’” 
was closely linked to the growing influence of “psychological thinking on American public life,” 
as well as the influence of “Jewish émigré intellectuals and social theorists….[who brought] 
European perspectives on anti-Semitism and Jewish self-consciousness to bear on wartime and 
postwar discussions of minority group psychology in the United States.”41 Although not the 
inventor of the phrase, Jean-Paul Sartre and his 1948 work, The Anti-Semite and the Jew, 
undoubtedly served to increase its use within a particularly Jewish context, though certainly 
Sartre’s concept had a close “analogue, ‘Negro self-hatred’”42 in America. Influenced by both 
Sartre’s and W.E.B. Du Bois’s notion of black “double consciousness,” Martiniquean 
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psychiatrist Frantz Fanon would continue to see convergences of the Jewish “self-hater” and his 
black counterpart, calling them as "brother[s] in misery.”43  
More specifically, however, Sartre describes how the world not only promotes anti-
Semitic attitudes and behavior in the Gentile community, but also feeds an anti-Semitic view to 
the Jew himself, trying to convince him of his own inferiority. Trapped in an identity that 
alienates him from both society and self-love, the diasporic Jew is given a choice between the 
“inauthentic” and “authentic” Jew: 
Such then is this haunted man, condemned to make his choice of himself on the basis of 
false problems and in a false situation, deprived of the metaphysical sense by the hostility 
of the society that surrounds him, driven to a rationalism of despair....He has been 
alienated even from his own body; his emotional life has been cut in two; he has been 
reduced to pursuing the impossible dream of universal brotherhood in a world that rejects 
him. …. It is we who constrain him to choose to be a Jew whether through flight from 
himself or through self-assertion; it is we who force him into the dilemma of Jewish 
authenticity or inauthenticity...The inauthentic Jew flees Jewish reality, and the anti-
Semite makes him a Jew in spite of himself; but the authentic Jew makes himself a Jew, 
in the face of all and against all.44   
In the condition of exile, the Jew is forced between two options in the face of the anti-Semitic 
world: to deny and hate himself and his own Jewishness in order to assimilate and gain social 
acceptance, or to accept his own Jewishness, even if it means remaining an outsider. What Sartre 
calls the “inauthentic” Jew is precisely the “self-hating” Jew, one who flees from and despises 
his Jewish identity because he is convinced of its inferiority.  
Taking cue from this history of Jewish preoccupation with self-hatred, Arendt’s critics 
frequently pointed to evidence of Arendt’s own self-hatred throughout the controversy. For 
example, Jacob Robinson, one of her fiercest critics, accused Arendt of internalizing Nazi logic 	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when Arendt told Eichmann in her report that “no one, that is, no member of the human race, can 
be expected to want to share the earth with you. This is the reason, and the only reason, you must 
hang.”45 Robinson noted that “this has the same ring as the 'sound instinct of the people' 
(Gesundes Volksempfinden)46 guiding the notorious Nazi People's Courts that tried enemies of 
the regime.”47 In other words, Arendt echoed the moral justifications of the Nazi ideology. Yet, 
accusations of Arendt’s personal prejudice were not always so subtle. In a headline that speaks 
for itself, Intermountain Jewish News published an article in April of 1963 entitled, “Self-hating 
Jewess Writes Pro-Eichmann Series for New Yorker Magazine.”48 The author of the article and 
editor for the Jewish News, Trude Weiss, made the case that “Hannah Arendt’s Jewish self-
hatred…is the motivation of her exercises to ‘play down’ the Jewish meaning and significance of 
all that has special Jewish meaning and significance.”49 Weiss was not alone in making this 
charge of self-hatred explicit. Leo Mindlin, a Jewish writer for a March 1963 ADL 
memorandum, called Arendt’s work a “kind of agonizing Jewish self-hatred.”50 For critics like 
Weiss, Arendt had internalized the anti-Semitic mindset and turned upon her own people. This 
trend only became more vicious. As Arendt friend Mary McCarthy noted in her emotional 
defense of Arendt in the Partisan Review, “her [Arendt’s] antagonists in private 'expose' her as 
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an anti-Semite, and a newspaper story speaks of the wife of an Israeli official in New York who 
kept calling her 'Hannah Eichmann'— by a slip of the tongue, of course."51 
The use of the term “self-hatred” is a way to remind the Jewish community of the 
insidious effects of assimilation. Certainly the term “self-hatred” was used to articulate a 
political stance on the need for a Jewish homeland. Yet, the accusation of self-hatred can also be 
seen as a vehicle through which Jews delineated expectations of speaking and acting as a Jew in 
the post-Holocaust world. Indeed, it signaled a limit as to what could be “said by and about Jews 
in public and whether nonconforming individuals had a right to speak ‘as Jews.’"52 The mark of 
“self-hatred” identified Arendt’s report beyond the limit of acceptable Jewish behavior. Arendt’s 
violation helped identify the limit at which one no longer could speak as a Jew. In other words, 
Arendt’s report was identified as the point at which one was speaking explicitly from the 
internalized view of the non-Jew, when one was articulating a negation of Jewishness rather than 
an acceptable expression of it. In March 1963, Journalist Leo Mindlin thus stated in The Jewish 
Floridian that Arendt had “gratuitously insult[ed] the memory of the sainted dead as 
Jews…while Hannah Arendt, in the affluence of her intellectual constellation, no longer even 
knows how to live like one [a Jew].”53 Mindlin’s case that Arendt “no longer even knows how to 
live like” a Jew reveals the extent to which reactions to Arendt’s blasphemous report helped 
identify exactly what it does means to “live like a Jew.” By reacting so strongly to Arendt’s 
report and marking it with the tag of “self-hatred,” Arendt’s critics publicly established her 
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report as beyond the limits of acceptable Jewish behavior, and in doing so, began to delineate the 
terms upon which one still spoke as a Jew.  
 Furthermore, because Arendt’s critics identified her report beyond the limits of 
acceptable Jewish behavior, her report itself became a yardstick with which one could measure 
one’s Jewishness. One’s reaction to her report became a sort of test for the mode of Jewishness 
one adopted. In spring 1963, for example, the author of an article covering Arendt’s report in The 
Carolina Israelite pointed out that “the first reaction to these articles—‘Did you read Hannah 
Arendt’—bespoke accusation.”54 In a telling video testimony, Dorrit Westheimer, the daughter 
of a Survivor and living in America at the time of the controversy, explained that her father 
became enraged after he found her with the book, and would not let her read it.55 The book itself 
also became a taboo around which one’s allegiances were defined. Even reading the book 
became a test of one’s loyalties. As Steven Aschheim explains, “It is a quite remarkable but 
telling fact that none of Hannah Arendt's work was translated into Hebrew until 2000."56 In other 
words, Arendt’s report became the negative example against which one’s Jewish loyalty was 
measured, and thus a rejection of her report was also a way to articulate and meet the public 
displays of loyalty expected by Jews.  
Although Arendt’s report and marks of “self-hatred” were vehicles through which 
American Jews established the limits of Jewish discourse, Arendt and her report also provided an 
opportunity to question those limits. When in 1963 Arendt received massive amounts of letters 
criticizing her report, many of the letters she received also welcomed the opportunity she seemed 	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to have granted the Jews: to speak openly, regardless of what was expected of them as Jews. In 
one of the most troubling letters, for example, a middle-aged Jewish man named Arnold Berson 
confessed to something he found “so difficult to explain to people.” For Berson, “though the man 
was cursed and detested by every Jewish person I know, I could not feel great hatred for 
Hitler.”57 Berson did not expect that Arendt would agree with him (in fact he tells her that he 
expects her to disagree), but reached out to her because he viewed her as an opportunity to 
challenge the limits he perceived on Jewish discourse. Although an extreme case, Berson reveals 
an interesting point about Arendt’s role in the controversy. She, in breaching modes of 
conventional Jewish discourse, became a rallying figure for those who felt those conventional 
modes to be restricting or silencing. She would test limits of discourse, and so many would 
follow her, albeit in different ways.  
	  
A Pariah Among Pariahs 
Hannah Arendt was accused of avoiding, even hating, her own identity, but Arendt did 
not wish to reject her own Jewishness. She was adamant that this fact was “indisputable.” A Jew 
could never escape their fate as a Jew, only renegotiate its possibilities. “If one is attacked as a 
Jew,” Arendt explained in an interview in 1964, “One must defend oneself as a Jew.”58 
Throughout her life, Arendt maintained this position. In We Refugees (1943), for example, she 
wrote: 
Lacking the courage to fight for a change of our social and legal status, we [the Jews] 
have decided instead, so many of us, to try a change of identity. And this curious 	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behavior makes matters much worse. The confusion in which we live is partly our own 
work…The recovering of a new personality is as difficult—and as hopeless—as a new 
creation of the world. Whatever we do, whatever we pretend to be, we reveal nothing but 
our insane desire to be changed, not to be Jews. All our activities are directed to attain 
this aim: we don’t want to be refugees, since we don’t want to be Jews; we pretend to be 
English-speaking people, since German-speaking immigrants of recent years are marked 
as Jews.59  
Arendt never encouraged a denial of one’s Jewishness, arguing that a refusal to accept this fact 
was a dangerous path that only served to limit Jews’ possibilities in the world. On this point 
Arendt and her critics ironically agreed: although she was accused of self-hatred, Arendt had also 
written for years on the importance of embracing one’s Jewish identity.  
In fact, Arendt had explored this very issue in the beginning of her career as an 
intellectual, writing Rahel Varnhagen: The Life of a Jewish Woman as part of her Ph.D. 
dissertation between the years of 1929 and 1933 (she first wrote on St. Augustine and love, and 
ultimately did not finish Rahel until 1938).60 With her biography of Rahel, a German Jewish 
writer alive during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, Arendt intended to “narrate 
the story of Rahel’s life as she herself might have told it,”61 but this historical pursuit also 
allowed her to examine the experience of living and being Jewish. Over the course of writing this 
biography, Arendt developed the idea of “fatefulness” attached to Jewishness. In a letter to Karl 
Jaspers on March 30, 1930, Arendt wrote that Rahel is “meant to show that on the foundation of 
being Jewish a certain possibility of existence can arise that I have tentatively and for the time 
being called fatefulness. This fatefulness arises from the very fact of ‘foundationlessness’ and 
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can occur only in a separation from Judaism.”62  As historian Seyla Benhabib put it in 2003, “in 
other words, being Jewish is a form of fate—it is more than an accident, because fate, although 
accidental, determines one’s life more fundamentally and more continuously than does an 
accident.”63 
In telling the story of Rahel Varnhagen, Arendt describes the insidious ways in which the 
social “fact” of being Jewish in an anti-Semitic world comes to affect their political, economic, 
and personal ways of life.  Arendt describes the “diabolic dilemma to which her [Rahel’s] life 
had been confined: on the one hand she had been deprived of everything by general social 
conditions, and on the other hand she had been able to purchase a social existence only by 
sacrificing nature.”64 In approaching the experience of existing as a Jew, Arendt also borrows the 
concepts of “parvenu” and “pariah” from French Journalist Bernard Lazare in order to articulate 
the diasporic Jew’s relationship to his surroundings. As Arendt explains in Rahel, because an 
anti-Semitic world “attributed to her [Rahel] what it considered to be the Jewish qualities,”65 
Rahel could not escape the fate of the Jew. No matter what how hard Rahel tried to hide from her 
own Jewishness, “Rahel’s life was bound by their [the Jews’] inferiority, by her ‘infamous 
birth.’”66 The Jews were left with the choice between the parvenu—Jews who “wanted to escape 
from Jewishness”67 in order to assimilate and gain social acceptance—and the pariah—the Jews 
who remain outsiders. Like Sartre before her, Arendt argued that there was a choice imposed 
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upon the Jewish people, a choice, as Sartre puts it, between “flee[ing] reality, and the anti-Semite 
makes him a Jew in spite of himself,” and accepting one’s Jewishness, “making [oneself] a Jew, 
in the face of all and against all.”68 
Yet, Arendt also goes on to argue explicitly for an embrace of the position of the pariah 
as a way to loosen the rigidity of the fate assigned to the Jews. Rather than forever binding one’s 
identity to a rejection of Jewishness, Arendt explains that choosing to embrace one’s difference 
makes room for more freedom in the possibilities of self-definition. As Arendt puts it in Rahel, 
“the possibilities of being different from what one is are infinite. Once one has negated oneself, 
however, there are no longer any particularly choices. There is only one aim: always, at any 
given moment, to be different from what one is; never to assert oneself, but with infinite pliancy 
to become anything else, so long as it is not oneself.”69  Arendt thus did not reject her own 
Jewishness but rather hoped to revisit its principles, arguing in support of the self-conscious 
pariah, who, as Seyla Benhabib has noted, “transforms difference from being a source of 
weakness and marginality into one of strength and defiance.”70 Despite the fact that Arendt’s 
report was precisely an attempt to embrace the strength of Jewishness and its outsider 
perspective, Arendt’s critics misinterpreted her embrace of a multiplicity of perspectives as a 
betrayal of her particular Jewish identity.  
Ironically enough, Arendt’s embrace of the self-conscious pariah would not have been 
something her critics would have necessarily hated. Both Arendt and her critics promoted a 
strong sense of Jewish identity that should not be denied nor hidden but rather refashioned as a 
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sense of strength. Yet, Arendt went further to explain that the pariah’s embrace of difference 
must not only promote the acceptance of Jewish alterity, but also promote an acceptance of all 
forms of alterity. As Judith Butler said of Arendt’s political thought in 2012, “the commitment to 
equality is a commitment to the process of differentiation itself… there is always a redoubling 
here that dislocates the claim from any specific community: everyone has the right of 
belonging.”71 Arendt criticizes Israeli Prime Minister Ben-Gurion, for example, for failing to see 
that Israel was a “people among peoples, a nation among nations, a state among states, 
depending now on a plurality which no longer permits the age-old and, unfortunately, religiously 
anchored dichotomy of Jews and Gentiles.”72 The Jewish pariah, according to Arendt, must use 
her outsider’s perspective to reveal precisely the dangers of oppressing all forms of difference 
and plurality. 
 In other words, Arendt believed the pariah’s role crucially involved providing an 
outsider’s perspective. This perspective is invaluable not only because it does not conform but 
also because it demonstrated the importance of “looking at something from the outside,” of 
challenging the status quo. Arendt invites an acceptance of not only Jewish difference but also 
difference itself. As Arendt’s biographer Elizabeth Young-Bruehl has noted, Arendt “was a 
pariah even among pariahs,”73 and learned to value non-conformist attitudes that could serve to 
promote further challenges to thinking. The value of the “outsider” was something Arendt had 
articulated many times before. As she put it in Recovery of the Public World, “You see, with the 
political business I had a certain advantage…you can see that I never felt the need to commit 
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myself [to any political party]…But still, I had this advantage to look at something from outside. 
And even in myself from outside.”74 The pariah held a privileged perspective that became a 
source of political hope for Arendt, one that could ground itself in challenges to the beliefs and 
approaches of the status quo. From this vantage point of the outsider, the pariahs, according to 
Arendt, “have one priceless advantage: history is no longer a closed book to them.”75 The “self-
conscious pariah” can open our eyes to new meanings of history in promoting new and distinct 
perspectives.
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Chapter 3 
 Arendt on Arendt: Reflecting on the Meaning of a Public Controversy 
 
 Hannah Arendt’s report on the 1961 trial of Adolf Eichmann did not take long to create 
waves of public outcry in America. After the first part of her five-part series for The New Yorker 
appeared on February 16, 1963, the controversy erupted, growing in strength as each installment 
deepened the stakes of the conversation. Later that year the series was edited and transformed 
into a book, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil, but its publication only 
added to the controversy that had embroiled the New York Intellectuals in a fierce and emotional 
debate. Although almost all the actors involved in the controversy became frustrated and 
dismayed with its vicious and seemingly unproductive nature, almost no one was more frustrated 
than Arendt herself.  
Three years later, and the controversy was hardly over: one of Arendt’s most tireless 
critics, Jacob Robinson, published And the Crooked Shall be Made Straight in January 1966, 
devoting the entire book to refuting Arendt’s Eichmann in Jerusalem. Amidst the renewed 
flames of the Eichmann controversy, a prominent rabbi named Arthur Hertzberg wrote to 
Hannah Arendt in order to apologize for an article he had written in praise of Robinson, against 
Arendt. In March 1966, he told her that his remarks had been wrong, declaring that “there are 
issues to be discussed, and that you [Arendt] raised almost all of them, but so far the discussion 
has not been equal to the searing dignity of the subject, or to the seriousness of your analysis, 
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which has been treated quite unfairly by almost everyone.”1 Arendt, in her response, was 
delighted to have engaged and been understood by this Arthur Hertzberg, but Arendt also made it 
clear that this encounter was rare, an exception to the rule of an otherwise exhausting and 
unproductive affair. After thanking Rabbi Hertzberg, Arendt wrote: 
You letter … came as a great surprise…What you did is almost never done; it is the 
unexpected after everything that had gone wrong is straightened out and is right again. As 
to the issues themselves: I know of course that I only raised them and did not answer my 
own questions. I had hoped for a real controversy, but you know what happened instead.2  
What does Arendt mean by a “real controversy,” and why does she believe the controversy 
surrounding her own book did not qualify as one? Arendt’s low opinion of her own controversy 
is a rather interesting one. What does it mean for a public intellectual to eschew the controversy 
she herself provoked? What does it mean for Hannah Arendt, a thinker dedicated to recovering 
sites of political contestation and negotiation, to be disappointed, dismayed even, at the 
controversy surrounding her own book? If this controversy has failed, what, then, makes a 
“good” controversy and effective political discourse? Was Arendt wrong to reject the Eichmann 
controversy as a worthwhile one? 
 In her reply to Arthur Hertzberg, Arendt also explains that her book “raised” but did not 
answer her “own questions.” Arendt, as she makes clear here and elsewhere, did not scorn the 
controversy because it failed to provide the “right” answer or interpretation to her questions, but 
because it failed to inspire a multiplicity of contending answers. Arendt was hoping to provoke 
important questions, to open a debate, not to close it with an imposition of one “correct” answer. 
It was precisely engaged disagreement she had hoped for. With Eichmann in Jerusalem, Arendt 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Arthur Hertzberg to Hannah Arendt, 31 March 1966. The Hannah Arendt Papers, Library of 
Congress.	  
2 Hannah Arendt to Arthur Hertzberg, 8 April 1966. The Hannah Arendt Papers, Library of 
Congress.  
 92 
wanted to challenge her readership with hard questions and painful problems, for even by the 
1960s the world had yet to face the scope of the “Final Solution” in its distinct horror. When the 
controversy emerged, the destruction of the European Jews was a Holocaust, not yet fully framed 
as the Holocaust, and the task of probing and telling the history of the Jewish catastrophe 
remained uncompleted. Even before the Eichmann trial, Arendt had been dedicated to exploring 
the twentieth century’s most difficult political problems. She was someone who wrote on the 
meaning of the public and the political, but also someone who hoped to engage in and recover 
those public and political debates as well. Witnessing Eichmann’s peculiar thoughtlessness, the 
unprecedented juridical-philosophical questions that the Nazi crimes provoked, and the 
burgeoning discussion of the Jewish functionary and council leader’s relationship to their 
murderers, Arendt could not resist engaging a problem that was as important as it was 
complex—particularly because this problem had affected her own life so greatly.  
This study argues that Arendt is a thinker centrally devoted to examining and engaging 
public conversation. It could even be said that “controversy”—a site of public disagreement and 
debate—is a concept that is fundamental in Arendt’s political theory and legacy. This chapter 
will use “Arendt contra Arendt,” re-examining the meaning and efficacy of discourse in the 
Eichmann controversy through an Arendtian lens. In other words, this chapter will employ 
Arendt’s own conceptions of the public, the political, and effective discourse to re-approach the 
history of Arendt’s own controversy. In flipping Arendt back upon herself—to put the thinker in 
conversation with herself—this chapter hopes to examine dimensions of the debate that Arendt 
failed to appreciate during the controversy. This chapter thus hopes to use Arendt’s tradition of 
thought as a way to reinvigorate a dynamic understanding of both her own legacy and thinking 
about public discourse more generally. If, as noted in Chapter 2, Arendt hoped to tell the story of 
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Rahel Varnhagen’s life “as she herself might have told it,”3 this chapter, too, hopes to tell the 
story of the controversy through Arendt’s eyes, that is, as Arendt herself might have seen it.  
  In order to evaluate the dimensions of the controversy in terms of Arendt’s political 
theory, section 1 of this chapter will introduce and provide an overview of Arendt’s notions of 
the public and the political. This section will primarily consider The Human Condition 
(originally published in 1958), Men in Dark Times (1968), and The Promise of Politics (collected 
essays published in 2005) in order to review Arendt’s remarks on politics throughout her life, 
both before and after the controversy. Arendt defined the political in terms of its fundamental 
plurality, exploring how men come together in a public world of appearances, being seen and 
heard not only to come together and share perspectives, but also to separate, to distinguish each 
man in his distinct perspective. Section 1 will also discuss Arendt’s role as a public intellectual—
Arendt was someone who not only theorized the possibilities and limitations of political action 
and speech, but also someone who hoped to wield effective discourse during the course of her 
own life as a public thinker.  
Section 2 will explore Arendt’s reactions to the controversy, first examining her initial 
reluctance to engage and respond to her critics, and then considering how and why she broke her 
silence, identifying the moments she used to reveal her increasing frustration with the manner in 
which the conversation had ensued. Arendt expressed her belief that the controversy had resulted 
in a campaign to reduce and present a false representation of her book, serving only to 
homogenize the circulation of ideas in the debate. The “image-makers” of the “Jewish 
Establishment,” according to Arendt, had stifled a very real discussion in so vehemently 
rejecting the ideas in her book, using the controversy as an opportunity to promote a single 	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interpretation—that Arendt’s provocations were prejudiced lies— rather than a site of 
contestation about these difficult questions.  
Section 3 will go on to reflect upon the legacy and meaning of this controversy, 
identifying the changes and discussions the report helped foster. In re-examining the controversy, 
this study finds that this debate was a watershed in American public conversations about the 
Holocaust, a site wherein modes of talking and remembering the Holocaust were negotiated and 
established. Certainly the controversy helped construct modes of historical approach and taboos 
of discourse, but this study finds that the controversy also provided sites and opportunities 
around which to challenge, rupture and contest prevailing history and historiography of the 
Holocaust. In fact, although the controversy helped build a dichotomy of interpretation that could 
stifle other possibilities of approach, both sides of the controversy articulated a defense of the 
importance of contestation, plurality and disagreement. Arendt herself not only served as a figure 
against which to argue, she also became a tool around which ruptures and new challenges to 
conventional thinking adhered.  
 
Arendt on Acting and Speaking in the Public World 
 Politics, Arendt explains, “is based on the fact of human plurality.”4 Arendt spent her 
lifetime thinking about how men5 come together, pondering the human condition not in terms of 
a single, human essence, but in the fact that men, in the plural, inhabit the world together. Yet, 
the crucial element of the public world is not just that men, as equals, come together, but rather 
than men, distinct and unique, must learn how to live together once the fact of their mutual 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Hannah Arendt, The Promise of Politics, 1st ed. (New York: Schocken Books, 2005), 93.  
5 This study will consciously use the male pronouns Arendt herself employed.  
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inhabitation of the world is birthed. For Arendt, we are “all the same, that is, human,” but only in 
such a way that “nobody is ever the same as anyone else who ever lived, lives, or will live.”6 We 
are all equal, but equal only in the fact of our utter distinction and difference from one another. 
The problem to examine is how different men come together to live in the world.  
The space of politics, then, does not reside within man as some so-called inherent 
characteristic, but only “arises between men, and so quite outside of man.”7 The space in between 
men, the world, is the site of human politics, and this space provides the reality in which we all 
take part. The “in-between” is a spatial metaphor for the relationship between men in politics, 
providing a means by which Arendt conceives of the world, or that which is common to all of us.  
And yet, this space is not only the intangible that connects us, that “arises out of acting and 
speaking together,”8 but is also the space wherein men negotiate their separateness and 
distinctiveness. Sticking with spatial and physical metaphor, Arendt describes the world as a 
table which both connects and distinguishes men in their difference: “to live together in the 
world means essentially that a world of things is between those who have it in common, as a 
table is located between those who sit around it; the world, like every in-between, relates and 
separates men at the same time.”9  
 Although the public is intangible in the sense that it arises between men, wherever they 
are, it is also, according to Arendt, the site of appearances, wherein each man is seen and heard, 
in turn seeing and hearing those around him. It is, as opposed to the private sphere, the realm in 
which we reveal ourselves to the world, for the public “means, first, that everything that appears 	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in public can be seen and heard by everybody and has the widest possible publicity. For us, 
appearance—something that is being seen and heard by others as well as by ourselves—
constitutes reality.”10 Men must appear in public, not only to present their distinct perspective, 
but also to engage the unique perspectives of those who share the world around him.  
 In describing the coming together of men, Arendt is also describing the process by which 
men and the world “attain their full reality.” For Arendt, it is not only that men “attain their full 
humanity, their full reality as men”11 in the public-political realm, but also that “the political 
realm rises directly out of acting together, the ‘sharing of words and deeds’…[is] the one activity 
which constitutes it [the public world].”12 Men come together to become men, while their action 
together forms the world that unites them in their difference. Yet, Arendt is centrally preoccupied 
with how distinct men come together and interact, how they understand and relate to one another. 
The way men relate to one another—how they understand each other’s distinct perspective on 
the world—is of crucial importance for Arendt’s thinking on politics. Arendt describes political 
thinking as process that can engage a variety of perspectives of the world as it appears to them, 
for this “this kind of understanding—seeing the world (as we rather tritely say today) from the 
other fellow’s point of view—is the political kind of insight par excellence.”13 The crucial 
understanding in politics for Arendt is that “no one can grasp the objective world in its full 
reality all on his own,” and as a result we can only explore the world “as it really is” by 
“understanding it as something that is shared by many people, lies between them, separates and 
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12 Arendt, The Human Condition, location 3028.  
13 Arendt, Promise of Politics, 18.  
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links them, showing itself differently to each.”14 We must, according to Arendt, see politics as a 
project of considering contesting standpoints, of negotiating plural and distinct points of view.  
  For Arendt to “recover” the public realm, she stressed the importance of preserving the 
plurality and difference in the visible perspectives that constitute the public. As Arendt 
explained, the public realm “relies on the simultaneous presence of innumerable perspectives and 
aspects in which the common world presents itself and for which no common measurement or 
denominator can ever be devised.”15 Thus, Arendt is dedicated to not only preserving plurality 
and difference, but also processes of pluralization and differentiation—political thinking 
involves considering different points of view, but also communicating, representing, engaging, 
sharing, and challenging those points of view in the public sphere. One should consider and 
encourage plurality, for “the end of the common world has come when it is seen only under one 
aspect and is permitted to present itself in only one perspective.”16  
 For Arendt, speech and action are the ways in which men relate to each other in the 
public realm. That is, through public speech and action, men “distinguish themselves instead of 
being merely distinct.”17  Arendt focuses on action as “the beginning of something new,”18 
something that enters the web of relationships in the public sphere in an unexpected and 
unpredictable manner. Action, and action in the form of speech, erupts the new and 
unprecedented; human action introduces new foundations and perspectives.  We can connect and 
negotiate with each other through action, but action also disrupts and contests the “pillars” of the 
world: “Action, moreover, no matter what its specific content, always establishes relationships 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Arendt, Promise of Politics, 129.  
15 Arendt, The Human Condition, location 1055.  
16 Arendt, The Human Condition, location 1068.  
17 Arendt, The Human Condition, location 2607.  
18 Arendt, Promise of Politics, 50.  
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and therefore has an inherent tendency to force open all limitations and cut across all 
boundaries.”19 Arendt stressed, then, possibility, contingency and unpredictability in human 
action in the public realm. 
 Arendt’s political role and legacy can be seen as one that stresses possibility in sites of 
vibrant political discourse. Political and Feminist theorist Bonnie Honig as well as feminist 
thinker and philosopher Judith Butler have done a particularly remarkable job in renegotiating 
Arendt’s political theory as one that encourages and defines a modern theory of political 
difference. As Honig has noted, “Arendt theorizes politics as an always unfinished business, 
committed simultaneously and perpetually to the settlement and unsettlement of identities, both 
personal and institutional.”20 We might consider Arendt’s role in this controversy, then, as one 
who at the outset hoped to provoke productive political discourse, one that not only engages a 
variety of perspectives, but one that promotes further possibilities of interpretations.  
 In Men in Dark Times, Arendt expresses her admiration for Enlightenment thinker 
Gotthold Lessing for his belief of this political plurality. Lessing’s “greatness,” she explains, 
“does not merely consist in a theoretical insight that there cannot be one single truth within the 
human world but in his gladness that it does not exist.”21 Arendt, the thinker who provoked the 
Eichmann controversy, was dedicated to understanding and promoting an understanding of 
human plurality. Arendt admired greatly this vibrant, plural ideal of politics, and hoped to 
preserve the public world in her own modern century, thinking without “banisters” and 
challenging our approach to the world. And yet, although she began the controversy—say, acted 
in the world—Arendt is not the only player in its process or result. Stories in the political realm 	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21 Hannah Arendt, Men in Dark Times (New York: Harcourt, 1968), 27.  
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cannot be made and attributed to one maker, it is begun by one but interacted and written by 
others—“nobody is its author.”22  
 Although Arendt was surprised at the fact that she had provoked such a heated 
controversy, she is not the only player in its story. This is, in fact, how we must view a 
controversy: as a site of contesting perspectives and players, uniting but differentiating at the 
same time. There is a sense of possibility in all controversies, for, as Arendt puts it, “it in the 
nature of beginning something new is started which cannot be expected from whatever may have 
happened before…the fact that man is capable of action means that the unexpected can be 
expected from him, that he is able to perform what is infinitely improbable.”23 
 
Arendt and her Reluctance to Engage 
 Arendt returned home from her vacation to a controversy, one that she was unhappy to 
see. Roughly 10 days after she arrived back in America (June 19, 1963), Arendt wrote to the 
America Council for Judaism about the controversy, complaining that the “Z.O.A. [Zionist 
Organization of America] and the Anti-Defamation League have conducted an organized 
campaign of slander.”24 For Arendt, this campaign was a “textbook case of manipulation of 
public opinion,” and although she seemed frustrated and dismayed to encounter the trouble, she 
also found it “rather interesting.”25 Yet, while intrigued by the debate, Arendt initially refused to 
further publicly engage with the matter, withdrawing from opportunities to debate her work in 
public. “I already said it many times, that the organized power of the many is by definition 	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Hannah Arendt Papers, Library of Congress.  
25 Ibid.  
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superior to whatever strength an individual can muster,” Arendt wrote to the Council. “I have 
decided that it would be neither wise nor proper for me to step into this whole business.”26 
Arendt continued to show a reluctance to participate in the controversy, growing in 
frustration with the manner in which her critics had engaged her book. The “organized 
campaign” had corrupted the integrity of the conversation for Arendt. She was unwilling to 
attempt to deconstruct the rigid discourse of her critics, who, in the eyes of Arendt, had 
sacrificed genuine debate for a homogenized outcry. The campaign was a “substitution” for a 
real debate: “‘A Defense of Eichmann,’ which I supposedly wrote, is a substitution for the real 
issue: what kind of man was the accused and to what extent can our legal system take care of 
these new criminals who are not ordinary criminals.”27 In one particularly telling correspondence 
with Shirley Passow of the Progress Committee, Arendt reveals her frustration with her critics. 
After Miss. Passow not only spells Arendt’s name wrong (‘Ahrendt’), but also asks Arendt to 
speak alongside Rabbi Joachim Prinz (who wrote a pamphlet for the ADL entitled “Arendt 
Nonsense”), Norman Podhoretz (a critic who wrote an article on the “perversity” of Arendt’s 
style), or Judge Michael Musmanno (who, of course, wrote the original, scathing review in the 
New York Times), Arendt replies in her typically assertive and strong manner. “I regret that my 
answer is no,” Arendt writes Passow frankly, 
Your choice of speaker combined with your misspelling of my name has convinced me 
that you and your audience are more interested in the political campaign which was 
touched off by my book than in the book itself (the misspelling of my name is suggesting 
because it occurred only in this campaign literature). I myself, though I am a political 
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scientist, am not in politics, Jewish or otherwise. Hence, I am not interested in the kind of 
debate you have in mind.28 
Arendt asserts that she is “not in politics,” not simply with regards to this controversy, but seems 
to make a claim for her role in the public realm more generally. Arendt echoed this statement 
elsewhere throughout the beginning of the controversy. After a Public Relations representative 
asked to organize a lecture tour about her book, Arendt adamantly refused when she replied in 
September 1963, not only because “at this particular moment I think it would be unwise for me 
to reply directly to polemical criticisms,” but also because “I don’t go on lecture tours, I am not 
the kind of person to do that, and I also don’t want to make that kind of money out of a publicity 
which I personally regard as an unhappy incident.”29 
 Although Arednt was known as a publically engaged intellectual—political theorist Dana 
Villa wrote that “from the mid-950s until her death in 1975, Arendt was best known as a public 
intellectual” 30—, Arendt also greatly valued intellectual engagement outside the boundaries of 
the public. In fact, Arendt seemed to reflect upon the importance of private or academic spaces 
of thinking as a result of the controversy. In her lecture notes for a University of Chicago lecture 
to Jewish students in October 1963, Arendt sets the rules of the discussion about her “book and 
not the reaction to it” by reflecting upon the importance of the academic space as opposed to the 
public:  
The great advantage: Every single one is forced to make up his own mind and then 
exchange this opinion with others…This advantage of the academic world precludes a 
certain kind of publicity if it is to remain intact. The academic world has, and always has 
had, it own kind of being open and public, but it is not the same as the publicity that is 
necessarily part of the world around it. For this kind of opinion formation, which 	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becomes rarer and rarer in the world around us, you need a certain amount of stillness 
and quiet. You need moreover the guarantee that what you said will not be shouted from 
the rooftops tomorrow, if you say it informally, casually, without preparation. We have 
too few rather than too many opportunities to speak to each other in an atmosphere of 
openness and frankness. The very spontaneity which is one of the great privileges of 
academic life is in jeopardy when the world around us is permitted to report to a so much 
larger audience than the words were originally meant to address, although they of course 
be very welcome to listen to it. The ivory tower is, thank God, a thing of the past, the 
academic and non-academic world, both public realms in their own right, today reach out 
to each other, but this does not mean that they coincide. The great privilege of the 
Academe is that it can foster, not indifference (that indeed would be disastrous), but 
impartiality and disinterestedness. As members of a University, this may be among the 
most important things we have to contribute to the world around us, to which we also 
belong—though in a different capacity.31 
This introductory speech to her Jewish students reveals an interesting moment of Arendt’s 
reflections on the controversy, for we see her trying to protect the academic sphere of discussion 
from the pernicious effects of the “public” world, from being “shouted from the rooftops.” 
Arendt, particularly as a result of her experience in the Eichmann controversy, is articulating the 
limitations of the public forum as a space of contestation and discussion, arguing its “publicity” 
threatens to destroy the conditions of a kind of “opinion formation”—a space of openness, 
“impartiality,” and spontaneity that tends to force everyone to “make us his own mind.” 
 Arendt, in fact, had been a person dedicated to engaging alternative spaces of thinking 
outside of the “public” realm. She was both a fierce academic and someone who endlessly 
exchanged ideas with her friends. Arendt’s friendship with Karl Jaspers and Mary McCarthy in 
particular had given a space through which to consider, develop and refine ideas, and she wrote 
endlessly on important issues outside of the public eye, between friends. This space of friends 
was crucially important to Arendt and her beliefs on thinking, and she made this clear in the 
controversy, especially when asked to publish her now famous letters with Gershom Sholem. 
When asked to publish them in Encounter by its editor John Mander, Arendt told him that she 	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“must consider the fact that I have kept silent throughout the polemics my book has aroused. I 
think this was the only right and proper thing to do under the rather peculiar circumstances.”32 
Her thinking with friends is altogether different and not refined for public presentation, she told 
Mander, explaining the trouble with publishing the letters is that she must “avoid the impression 
that this letter to Scholem (an old friend) is all or even a significant part of what I would have to 
say if I should ever choose to reply in public.”33 Yet, she ultimately agreed to publish them on 
the grounds that they were framed as ideas formed outside the terms of the public sphere— “My 
advice would be not to recast the letter in the third person,” Arendt tells Scholem, arguing that 
“the value of this controversy consists in its epistolary character, namely in the fact that it is 
informed by personal friendship.”34 
 It is interesting that, although Arendt praised the sanctity and preservation of thinking in 
spaces outside the public, she also thought it worthwhile to publish these private letters between 
friends in 1964. The “value” in the letters for Arendt, then, was that they demonstrated ideas that 
challenged the terms of the controversy, not necessarily because of the content of the ideas but 
because the space of their formation stood in opposition to the limitations and dangers built into 
the structures of the public sphere. They were a public display of the controversy debated 
explicitly outside of the public eye, thus Arendt could find value in its ability to publicly 
question the validity of the terms of opinion formation during the controversy. Here, Arendt 
shows us her belief that the controversy failed not only because it resulted in a single 
misinterpretation of her book, but also because the “publicity” of the debate reinforced this 	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homogeneity. “Publicity,” in other words, can spoil honest engagement because it subjects the 
process of opinion formation to the standards, demands and taboos of the public world. Not all 
public debating fails, but public engagement can discourage the openness and frankness that 
promotes freedom and plurality of ideas. If this is the case, one’s public engagement should be 
coupled with private engagements as such. Conversations with friends or family are never “all or 
even a significant part” of what we might say in the public eye because they provide space to test 
and engage one another’s ideas. Conversations of this sort are valuable precisely because they 
allow the speaker the freedom to change and refine their ideas before they present them to the 
public—and, most centrally, these spaces allow the speaker to form their ideas through 
independent thought rather than thought that is beholden to the standards of public opinion. One 
can see this well in the way Arendt spoke fondly of her relationship with her friend and mentor, 
Karl Jaspers. “What was so great in these conversations with Jaspers,” Arendt told us, “was that 
you could sustain such an effort, which was merely being tentative, which did not aim at any 
results….disagreement was never quite resolved. But the thinking about such a thing itself 
became immensely richer, through this exchange, as he said, ‘without reservations,’ that is, 
where you don’t keep anything back.”35 By publishing the letters and articulating why, Arendt 
shows us the ways in which the space, public or private, very deeply informs the process of 
forming opinions.  
 Arendt was adamant that the debate had failed to provide the proper conditions for a 
“real” controversy, and by 1966 had grown exhausted by the tenacity of her critics’ assault. After 
the publication of Jacob Robinson’s And the Crooked Shall be Made Straight, a book virtually 
comprised of line-by-line refutations of Eichmann in Jerusalem, Arendt made an assertive 	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entrance36 into the public debate with an article entitle “‘The Formidable Dr. Robinson’—A 
Reply” in January 20, 1966 issue of The New York Times Review of Books. Arendt called Dr. 
Robinson formidable not because she considered him a worthy opponent—in fact the review is 
full of disparaging remarks about Robinson’s reading level—but because of the strength of his 
“image-making” in manipulating public opinion to believe in his misleading portrait of her book, 
something Arendt regarded as an unfortunate element of this controversy. Arendt wrote that “Mr. 
Robinson’s present book is only the last, the most elaborate, and the least competent variation of 
the “image” of a posthumous defense of Eichmann, a book that no one ever wrote but of whose 
reality even people who had read my book became convinced under this stupendous barrage, 
quickly changed their minds.”37 Arendt lamented that “such campaigns” gain in “momentum and 
viciousness as they proceed,” seeing no end to the homogenizing effect of their pernicious 
representation of her book. Arendt remarked that almost all of the ideas in the 1963 ADL 
pamphlet (by Robinson) “were used then on by almost every reviewer….as though, in Mary 
McCarthy’s telling phrase, they came out of a mimeographing machine.”38 
 In this public reply, Arendt was explicit in her belief that there was a concerted attempt to 
defame her book, writing with clear irritation for the “campaign” of the “Jewish Establishment.”  
Arendt seems frustrated to an extreme degree in this reply, writing that “no one will doubt the 
effectiveness of modern image-making, and no one acquainted with Jewish organizations and 
their countless channels of communication outside their immediate range will underestimate 
their possibilities in influencing public opinion. For greater than their direct power of control is 	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the voluntary outside help upon which they can draw from Jews who...will flock home, as it 
were, out of age-old fears…when their people or its leaders are criticized.”39 Arendt’s rather 
harshly articulated defense tended to have the effect of providing her critics with more evidence 
of her personal prejudice against the Jews, and did not necessarily loosen the terms of the debate 
as she may have hoped. Marie Syrkin in particular did not take well to Arendt’s reply and used it 
to highlight her belief that Arendt’s motive was primarily prejudice, remarking that “Miss 
Arendt’s sinister version of powerful ‘Jewish organizations and their countless channels of 
communication outside their immediate range’ manipulating public opinion through all the 
‘means of mass communication’ has an all too familiar ring.”40 
 Arendt, of course, denied Marie Syrkin’s couched accusations of sinister prejudice, 
arguing that she “stated the fact of an organized propaganda campaign to manipulate public 
opinion; If all organizations and interest groups in the world that indulge in such activities were 
rewarded as “conspirators” the world would be full of conspiracies, which it is not.”41 According 
to Arendt, she was not trying to criticize the “Jewish Establishment” as a particularly 
“manipulative” or “conspiring” group, but rather was trying to critique a more common 
phenomenon of producing and receiving static ideas. Arendt here and in her other public replies 
hoped to defend not only against the specific misinterpretation of her book, but against the 
conditions of the debate that denied opportunities for multiple, contesting and engaged 
perspectives. It was less the specific interpretation than the fact that there was only one 
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interpretation, a singular portrait circulated through “image-making.” 
 We could have expected this response from Arendt. She was a theorist who had always 
believed in preserving spaces for thinking; she focused not on finding “truth,” but on the spaces 
that permitted possibilities for thinking about truth. It is not her goal to find a platonic absolute 
(whether she believed in such a thing or not), but to foster the conditions for thinking itself—the 
process and terms that breathe possibility, contestation, spontaneity, movement. Her life is 
marked with declarations about this dedication. On August 20, 1954, for example, Arendt writes 
to Mary McCarthy about her views on Truth. For Arendt,  
The chief fallacy is to believe that Truth is a result which comes at the end of a thought-
process. Truth, on the contrary, is always the beginning of thought; thinking is always 
result-less. That is the difference between ‘philosophy’ and science: Science has results, 
philosophy never. Thinking starts after an experience of truth has struck home, so to 
speak. The difference between philosophers and other people is that the former refuse to 
let go, but not that they are the only receptacles of truth. This notion that truth is the result 
of thought is very old and goes back to ancient classical philosophy, possibly to Socrates 
himself. If I am right and it is a fallacy, then it probably is the oldest fallacy of Western 
philosophy. You can detect it in almost all definitions of truth….Truth, in other words, is 
not ‘in’ thought, but to use Kant’s language[,] the condition for the possibility of 
thinking. It is both, beginning and a priori.42 
In a word, Arendt’s thinking on truth provides us with a way to understand why she believed the 
controversy failed to generate productive discourse. It is not that the controversy failed to arrive 
at the “correct” or “true” understanding of the Holocaust, but that it failed to promote a diverse 
set of contesting understandings. For Arendt, her critics provided a singular interpretation 
through which to engage these problems, and in doing so, inhibited possibility in our 
understanding rather than fostering it.  
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A Conversation that Opens the Door  
As historians like Peter Novick and Anson Rabinbach have pointed out, the Eichmann 
trial and controversy were among the first events in America that considered the memory of the 
Holocaust, distinct in its horror from other Nazi crimes. In fact, these historians have argued that 
the controversy “was a watershed in the public uses and public acceptance of discussion of 
Holocaust memory, a memory previously restricted to a relatively small, and relatively unknown, 
coterie of scholars.”43 This study would agree with this conclusion—that the controversy opened 
the doors to public debates about Holocaust memory. Even with this broad interpretation of the 
debate, we can see why we might indeed call this controversy a “real” one. It did not provide the 
final word on Holocaust memory nor reach a consensus, but rather became a germinating seed of 
discourse, provoking a flood of scholarship and public discussion in the decades that followed.  
 Yet, this study would go further than Novick and Rabinbach, arguing that the controversy 
was not a watershed only because it helped begin the discussion about the subject of Holocaust 
memory, but because it was fundamentally a debate about how one can talk about Holocaust 
memory. It was not only a debate about the history of the Holocaust, it was a debate about how 
to talk, approach and represent this history. The form of approach to this history was of central 
concern for the beginning of Holocaust scholarship, not only because it was an event that largely 
still needed to be examined and recorded, but also because the actual event of the Holocaust 
seemed to challenge, or even destroy, the terms through which thinking and judging had hitherto 
been practiced. Adorno put it well in his 1966 Negative Dialectics when he told us “our 
metaphysical faculty is paralyzed because actual events have shattered the basis on which 
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speculative metaphysical thought could be reconciled with experience.”44 The Eichmann 
controversy was thus an initial attempt at rebuilding our ability to approach and examine the 
world, for the Holocaust had in many ways shattered our understanding of history itself—it 
presented us with both an intent to destroy specific histories and a history that, in its depth of 
unspeakable horror, escaped our ability to fully express it.  
The Eichmann controversy, because it helped begin the conversation and largely failed to 
produce a satisfying consensus, ended in a demand for more studies and debates concerning the 
Holocaust. As Arendt noted in 1966, “literally everybody feels the need for a ‘major work’ on 
the Jewish conduct in the face of catastrophe.”45 It was a watershed indeed, and a consciously 
produced one, for the controversy above all highlighted the need for and demanded more 
research. After Norman Podhoretz bemoaned the controversy because of the viciousness with 
which Jews attacked other Jews—he asked, “the Nazis destroyed a third of the Jewish people. In 
the name of all that is humane, will the remnant never let up on itself?”—one Manfred Stanley 
wrote a letter to the editors of Commentary, expressing the prevailing mood of the controversy 
quite well. As Stanley put it, “‘in the name of all that is humane’ we, the remnant—whatever our 
faith and nationality—can never dare to “let up” on ourselves with regard to the larger issues 
which Hannah Arendt and others have done so much to bring to our attention.”46 To be sure, 
there was an urgency expressed in the reactions to the controversy; a great and pressing demand 
for Holocaust scholarship in the face of the realization of its lacuna. As Walter Laqueur put it in 
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1966 in response to And the Crooked Shall be Made Straight, “the whole future of this official 
historiography is now in balance.”47  
This watershed of Holocaust research was itself a sign that this should be considered a 
“real” controversy, for this was merely the beginning of the debate, a point of departure. Even 
for Arendt, the controversy provided possibility for the future because it was the beginning: 
“These are serious and even terrible questions, and neither the present unanimity of Jewish 
official opinion nor any “coordination” of research will be able to prevent independent scholars 
from asking them and trying to find an answer. The greatest weakness of this unanimity is that it 
is of so very recent origin.”48 By producing a demand for more scholarship, the controversy did 
provide a challenging landscape to the public debate, but the topics and form of the controversy 
also helped make this conversation a site of contestation—a “real” controversy. Arendt had 
crossed a boundary of acceptable discourse that had not yet been defined, and through her 
perceived violation Arendt provoked a debate that hoped to identify the boundary she had 
supposedly crossed. If Arendt had failed and violated proper terms, then what terms should one 
employ in histories of the Holocaust? 
This study argues that the space of the controversy was a powerfully challenging one not 
only because it pushed for more scholarship, but also because both sides directly articulated a 
critique of static, homogenizing discourse. Arendt’s critics, on the one hand, promoted sites of 
contestation because they opposed the existence of the “final word” on the Holocaust, warning of 
the danger and discrimination the “final word” could bring if it is one of a prejudiced and anti-	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Semitic nature—the power of prejudiced discourse and its potential for violence was acutely felt. 
Arendt, on the other hand, endlessly promoted the preservation of contending perspectives; of 
pluralism and possibility as necessary conditions for thought. Both sides of the controversy 
openly demanded forums for debate and disagreement, and both sides feared the pernicious 
effects of unanimity in public opinion. If there was one thing both could agree on, it was that 
agreeing could be dangerous in the modern world, particularly if they agreed on a destructive 
idea, and the ability to contest a perspective was a paramount one.  
Arendt did not necessarily see that her critics were also promoting a sense of plurality. In 
fact, she was so dismayed at the homogeneity of responses that she did not consider many of her 
critics’ opinions legitimate. That being said, Arendt went further in her push for contestation than 
her critics during the controversy because she articulated a defense of differentiation and 
pluralization in public discourse itself rather than fighting for the necessity of contestation in 
reference to a specific idea. Arendt’s critics were less worried about homogeneity than they were 
homogeneity around their perceived interpretation of Arendt. In contrast, Arendt was more 
worried about promoting a multiplicity of perspectives on her book than correcting the specific 
misinterpretation circulated by her critics—in other words, she was more saddened by the 
consistency in her critics than their misunderstanding of her book.  When she reviewed Jacob 
Robinson’s book, she titled her article “Formidable Dr. Robinson,” but what is formidable about 
Dr. Robinson was not his argument, but the fact that his argument became the singular way to 
see her book. As she puts it, “it is awe-inspiring that for years now, simply on his having said so, 
the news has echoed around the globe that my book contained 'hundreds of factual errors’ and 
that I had not written a trial report but ‘scrutinized the data concerned with the Nazi 
 112 
extermination of European Jewry.’”49 In contrast, Arendt defends herself in order to encourage 
more disagreement, for “I [Arendt] try, not to indoctrinate, but to rouse or awaken.”50 
Most interestingly, Arendt not only articulated the terms by which a proper debate should 
conduct itself, but also became a figure (or symbol) through which those ideals could manifest in 
the debate about Holocaust memory. As noted in Chapter 2 of this study, Arendt became the 
figure around which contestations of the status quo of Jewish interpretation adhered. She was a 
disrupting figure and a figure of disruption. She articulated not simply challenging ideas, but also 
the need for processes of contestation. It was not new ideas Arendt looked for, but how to 
endlessly produce them, and through both her theory and the example of her public figure Arendt 
provided such a process of contestation.
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Conclusion 
Negotiating the Controversy Through History 
 
Arendt is a thinker who challenges us, but she must not be viewed as the “mastermind” 
behind the controversy. From the perspective of the historian, the controversy surrounding 
Eichmann in Jerusalem should not be framed in terms of Arendt’s ability to direct or provoke 
conversation. “Action,” as Arendt reminds us in Promise of Politics, begins something new and 
causes “the formation of a chain of unpredictable consequences.”1 Certainly the controversy was 
“unpredictable” in that it took on a life of its own, distinct from Arendt’s intentions. In fact, 
Arendt was frequently surprised and dismayed by the nature of the debate she helped provoke.  
In this sense, Arendt was only one actor in the controversy, and the subject and terms of the 
debate were different from what Arendt proposed in her report. If the controversy is to be better 
understood, the historian must acknowledge the many voices that impacted the nature of the 
debate.  
In addition to viewing Arendt as one historical actor among many, this study approaches 
the controversy through Arendt’s own eyes.  Arendt’s mode of thinking reaches even more 
useful lengths when refashioned as a historical lens through which we can revisit the 
controversy, learning from its events through an “Arendtian” retelling of the story. Employing an 
Arendtian lens does not preclude a plural portrait of the controversy nor does it subsume the 
other actors’ voices under Arendt’s. In fact, approaching the controversy through an Arendtian 
lens forces the historian to consider Arendt as only one actor among many—it is precisely an 
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Arendtian lens that demands a history comprised of many voices. By telling the story of this 
history we can understand Arendt as a subject and lens, revealing a deeper sense of the 
dimensions of her discourse and the extent to which an idea or thinker can impact the world and 
our understanding of it. Flipping Arendt back upon herself can also renegotiate the problems the 
controversy discussed, the ways they were debated, and what we can learn from the debate.  
Although Arendt is a figure who disrupts, she is also a figure who wrote about writing 
and building history, of preserving and retelling the past. As Arendt put it, “it is the publicity of 
the public realm which can absorb and make shine through the centuries whatever men may want 
to save from the natural ruin of time.”2 Arendt was devoted to preserving the past, to recovering 
the world that connected and separated men. History not only preserves the past for our world, 
but retells and therefore learns from it: “Action reveals itself fully only to the storyteller, that is, 
to the backward glance of the historian, who indeed always knows better what it was all about 
than the participants… [it is] the storyteller who perceives and ‘makes’ the story.”3 Through 
history we can “recall the significant events in our lives by relating them to ourselves and 
others,”4 connecting, constructing and learning from our world. For Arendt, history is not merely 
a means to understand the past, but also a means to build the world we live in. Arendt paints this 
negotiation with the past as an endlessly ongoing project, for if “storytelling reveals meaning 
without committing the error of defining it,” the past is left “undefined,” ripe in possibilities of 
meaning for the future. Arendt encourages us to view history not as a “closed book” but as a 
space of endless reinterpretation. The historian “makes” the story to understand the past, but the 
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historian in a sense also “makes” the world now and for the future. It is the future, and not only 
the past, at stake in Arendt’s thinking on history.  
As hinted above, revisiting the controversy through Arendt’s eyes also forces the 
historian to consider the eyes of others in the controversy as distinct from one another. 
According to Seyla Benhabib’s understanding of Arendt, Arendt argues that “in re-creating this 
plural and perspectival quality of the shared world, the historian could accomplish his or her task 
only so far as his or her faculty of imagination was not limited to one of these viewpoints.”5  The 
historian must “recreate the world of others,” and present the world from multiple points of view. 
Arendt’s lens is one that demands a consideration of more than one perspective. As Arendt 
argues, “political thought is representative, I form an opinion by considering a given issue from 
different viewpoints, by making present to my mind the standpoints of those who are absent; that 
is, I represent them.”6 If we are to learn from this controversy, we must retell it, representing yet 
engaging its perspectives in terms of their distinctions and diversity. In this sense, the act of 
retelling the story is also a practice in thinking: as the historian narrates the story, she must form 
an independent thought yet consider the perspectives of others. It could even be said that the 
practice of Arendtian history is not only a means to an end (to an understanding of the past) but 
also an end in itself, conditioning the historian to the very thinking Arendt saw as the way to 
“recover” the world.   
 In considering the narrative through Arendt’s eyes, it is also interesting, perhaps ironic, 
that Arendt became one side of a dichotomy of interpretation over the course of the controversy, 
for Arendt eschewed thinking it terms of dichotomies and their restrictions on the multiplicity of 	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thought. For she was a side of a controversy that split into two, Arendt against her critics, yet 
Arendt would never have wanted such a limiting frame of interpretation. Arendt was refashioned 
and represented as a symbol for a view she never espoused, and this portrait of Arendt’s work 
would become the figure against which her critics argued. Hence, her critics argued against what 
they perceived to be her argument, and in doing so, formed this dichotomy of interpretation that 
never quite was there to begin with. As Arendt has pointed out in 1966, “if they [her critics] had 
left well enough alone, this issue, which I had touched upon only marginally, would not have 
been trumpeted all over the world.”7 Her critics created their own image of their opposition, 
constructing a “two-sided” debate that informed the controversy. Yet, neither Arendt’s avoidance 
nor public comments helped to break down this structure. Moreover, this dichotomous frame 
tended to produce the very homogenous response that Arendt criticized. In always arguing 
against the same, false idea of Arendt’s work, Arendt believed her critics formed a singular 
response. As Arendt put it in her 1964 postscript to Eichmann in Jerusalem, it was as “though 
the pieces written against the book (and more frequently against its author) came ‘out of a 
mimeographing machine’ (Mary McCarthy)…the clamor centered on the ‘image’ of a book 
which was never written, and touched upon subjects that often had not only not been mentioned 
by me but had never occurred to me before.”8  
This structure had the effect of stifling debates that challenged the participants’ beliefs, 
not only in reducing the possibilities of interpretation but also in fostering an atmosphere of 
allegiance versus betrayal, marking certain reactions to her book as a measurement of one’s 
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social loyalties. This atmosphere—that tied one’s reaction to Arendt to a display of one’s 
Jewishness—discouraged a thorough engagement with the text. In fact, Arendt’s critics 
presented her as a traitor, making the rejection of her book the unquestioned, almost default 
method of engagement. As one Jewish historian pointed out in 1966, “I have rarely addressed a 
Jewish forum without facing the interrogation of an outraged congregant who insists on knowing 
my reaction to Hannah Arendt's 'folk libel,’”9 suggesting the answer to the question was more a 
way to prove allegiance than an opportunity to consider her book.  
And yet, re-examining the controversy through an “Arendtian” lens, one cannot simply 
characterize the controversy as a battle between two sides. If one considers, for example, the 
perspectives in the debate beyond a dichotomous frame, it is easy to identify more than two 
perspectives on the matter. The debate expressed a richer, more nuanced fabric of debate than 
simply a battle between two sides. “Arendt versus Critics” would be a misleading frame. It 
would ignore the many voices that gave life and meaning to the debate—from Jacob Robinson’s 
entire book of refutations to Norman Podhoretz’s plea for a less acrimonious debate; from Mary 
McCarthy’s emotional defense of Arendt to the students that sent Arendt poetry. Revisiting the 
controversy not only shows how the debate did present a plurality of perspectives, but also how 
almost everyone involved in the controversy articulated the importance of debate and 
contestation, even if only to defend the right to publicly challenge dangerous portraits of Jews 
and their history. If, as Arendt tells us, the world “is shared by many people, lies between them, 
separates…them,” the world also “links them…Only in the freedom of our speaking with one 
another does the world, as that about which we speak, emerge in its objectivity and visibility 
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from all sides.”10 If the players in the Arendt controversy represented distinct views of the world, 
they also were connecting to each other, particularly in their shared appreciation for endless 
debate of Jewish history and identity. Moreover, Arendt and a majority of her critics were 
Jewish. In this sense, they were connected in “fate” as Jews. As Arendt put it in Rahel 
Varnhagen, “Judaism could not be cast off by separating oneself from the other Jews; it merely 
became converted from a historical destiny, from a shared social condition, from an impersonal 
‘general woe’ into a character trait, a personal defect in character. Judaism was an innate in 
Rahel as the lame man’s too-short leg.”11  
In retelling the story of the Eichmann controversy, the historian thus should not simply 
dwell on the ways in which this “dichotomy” informed the debate. Moreover, the historian does 
not have to remain beholden to the structures of the controversy. Historiography leaves room for 
a negotiation with, not necessarily an adoption of, the perspectives presented in a history. The 
historian can draw meaning herself, for, as Arendt put it in The Human Condition (1958), “The 
trouble is that whatever the character and content of the subsequent story may be, whether it is 
placed in private or public life, whether it involves many or few actors, its full meaning can 
reveal itself only when it has ended.”12 Thus, thinkers like Richard Wolin and Daniel Goldhagen 
take the wrong approach when they reinterpret Arendt and the controversy through some of the 
dangerous, misleading terms the debate itself employed. In Richard Wolin’s Fall 2014 review of 
Bettina Stangneth’s book, Eichmann Before Jerusalem, The Unexamined Life of a Mass 
Murderer, for example, Wolin tells us that Arendt  “established an historical paradigm that 
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‘banal’ and bureaucratic, and to exaggerate the culpability of their Jewish victim…In seeking to 
downplay the German specificity of the Final Solution by universalizing it, Arendt also strove to 
safeguard the honor of the highly educated German cultural milieu from which she herself 
hailed.”13 Wolin’s argument almost exactly echoes Arendt’s 1960s critics’ point: that Arendt 
wanted to exculpate Eichmann and to place more blame on the Jews. Ultimately Wolin seems to 
shed little light on Arendt’s approach that the debate itself did not argue.14  
 In contrast, this study views Arendt as both a pillar and a disruption of this “dichotomy” 
in the controversy, and Arendt herself provides the conditions through which this limited 
approach can be challenged for us as historians. Thus, if the controversy produced a dichotomy 
that was unproductive—in the sense that Arendt’s critics often engaged the book through a 
dichotomous frame that tended to preclude an honest reading of her book—the controversy also 
produced the terms through which the dichotomy can be broken down. An “Arendtian lens” 
provides a frame of thinking that disrupts rigid discourse and encourages thinking in terms of 
possibilities and openness. Even in 1971, Arendt argued forcefully for such a frame, writing 
against forms of thinking that reduce possibility to rigid choices, for “the fallacy of such thinking 
begins with forcing the choices into mutually exclusive dilemmas; reality never presents us with 
anything so neat as premises for logical conclusions.”15 Arendt, employed as a historical subject 
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and lens, does not provide the answer to the controversy, but encourages the possibility for 
learning and sparking new ones. Thus the debate was a “real” controversy not only in the sense 
that it provoked challenging debates about how to talk about the Holocaust but also because 
revisiting its narrative provides the terms for renegotiating and challenging the conversation. As 
A.M. Hill tells us in the introduction to Recovery of the Public World (1979), “unlike theorists in 
the mainstream, Hannah Arendt does not so much tell us what to think or what to do, as she 
offers an example of how we might engage in thinking given the conditions of our world.”16  
We must rewrite the historiography of Arendt, reclaim her mode of thinking that 
promotes possibility. As Arendt’s friend Karl Jaspers wrote to her in a letter to her on July 25, 
1963, “'You have hit many people's most sensitive nerve endings—a lie in their very existence—
and they hate you...The truth will be beaten to death, as Kierkegaard said of Socrates and Jesus. 
Now, it has not come to this and it will not. But you have been given a fama, which, for you, is 
not the right thing, detestable. In the long run your character will, of course prevail and triumph 
radiantly."17 Although here Jaspers hoped to console Arendt about her enduring legacy, there is 
more at stake in reclaiming Arendt than allowing her character to “triumph radiantly.” Indeed, 
Arendt’s thinking can be refashioned as a tool for a continued process of historical inquiry into 
Eichmann in Jerusalem. As Arendt tells us, it is the storyteller who makes the story and gives it 
meaning. In this sense, this study hopes to “make” Arendt’s story into one that will challenge 
how we think about our world, both past and future.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/1971/nov/18/lying-in-politics-reflections-on-the-
pentagon-pape/  
16 Melvyn A. Hill, introduction to Hannah Arendt, Recovery of the Public World, ed. Melvyn A. 
Hill (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1979), x.  
17 Karl Jaspers to Hannah Arendt, 25 July 1963, in Hannah Arendt/ Karl Jaspers 
Correspondence, 1926-1969, ed. Lotte Kohler and Hans Saner (New York: Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich, 1992), 354.  
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If, for example, we reconsider Arendt’s retelling of Plato’s cave allegory in Promise of 
Politics, we can begin to see how her thinking might promote possibility in interpretation and 
meaning. In discussing Plato’s cave, Arendt describes how “Plato means to give a kind of 
concentrated biography of the philosopher.”18 Plato’s philosopher, unlike his fellow cave 
dwellers, is able to realize that “the images on the screen at which the cave dwellers stare are 
their doxai, what and how things appear to them. If they want to look at things as they really are, 
they must turn around, that is, change their position because, as we saw before, every doxa 
depends on and corresponds to one’s position in the world.”19 After he emerges from the cave to 
the world of “eternal essences” and truth, he returns back the cave, and “can no longer see in the 
darkness of the cave, they have lost their sense of orientation, they have lost what we would call 
their common sense.”20 The philosopher returns to a cave vicious and hostile to him.  
In Arendt’s retelling, Arendt describes how the philosopher stands in tension to the world 
of men, for “he is to an extent alienated from the city of men, which can only look with suspicion 
on everything that concerns man in the singular.”21 Yet, the philosopher, in his perpetual state of 
wonder “at that which as it is”22 (thaumadzein), also has an advantage, for he is “the only one 
who has no distinct and clearly defined doxa to compete with other opinions, the truth or untruth 
of which common sense wants to decide.”23 The philosopher’s state of wonder is also a state of 
asking questions, of endlessly opening up new possibilities. As Arendt puts it:  
It is from the actual experience of not-knowing, in which one of the basic aspects of the 
human condition on earth reveals itself, that the ultimate questions arise—not from the 
rationalized, demonstrable fact that there are things man does not know, which believers 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Arendt, The Promise of Politics, 29.  
19 Ibid.   
20 Ibid., 29-30.  
21 Ibid., 35.  
22 Ibid., 34.  
23 Ibid., 36.  
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in progress hope to see fully amended one day, or which positivists may discard as 
irrelevant. In asking the ultimate, unanswerable questions, man establishes himself as a 
question-asking being.24  
Arendt goes on to try to imagine the potential for “political philosophy” to maintain this sense of 
wonder, this perpetual state of asking questions and loosening opinion, while at the same time 
confronting the “alienation” the philosopher experiences as a result of his focus on “man in the 
singular.” Arendt tells us, “If philosophers, despite their necessary estrangement from the 
everyday life of human affairs, were ever to arrive at a true political philosophy, they would have 
to make the plurality of man, out of which arises the whole realm of human affairs—in its 
grandeur and misery—the object of their thaumadzein.”25  
If, then, we reimagine Arendt’s engagement in the Eichmann controversy as a “cave 
allegory” of sorts, we can see how Arendt’s approach to her world is different—and more 
destabilizing—than the philosopher’s in Plato’s cave. Although Arendt and Plato’s philosopher 
both confront a world that responds viciously to them, Arendt confronts the public world not as a 
philosopher, but as a political theorist, someone who adamantly maintained that she was not a 
philosopher because she was concerned with politics. Unlike Plato’s philosopher, she was 
concerned with men, not man. In fact, it is Arendt’s understanding of human plurality that 
defines her thinking in the political space. Moreover, Arendt does not hope to understand 
“eternal essences” or abstract truths like Plato’s philosopher. Arendt reveals and defends her 
views in Eichmann in Jerusalem not to stick to a singular viewpoint but rather to ask her critics 
to consider her work. Arendt hoped that her critics would engage her work not because she was 
stubborn and wanted them to agree with her, but because she hoped that in considering her work 
her critics would loosen their thinking and approach to the subject. She wanted her work to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Ibid., 34.  
25 Ibid., 38.  
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promote the practice of thinking in terms of plurality, of considering other points of view. 
Arendt’s defense of her position is not like the philosopher who tries to impose their “truth” on 
the world. Arendt asked not for agreement but precisely for disagreement and contestation in the 
controversy.  
Arendt is distinctly not Plato’s philosopher. “I do not want to indoctrinate,” Arendt told 
us in 1972. “That is really true. I do not want anybody to accept what I may think.”26  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Arendt, Recovery, 336.  
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